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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is concerned with the economic nature of corruption and its behavior in 
Hong Kong construction industry. In this dissertation, corruption is defined as “the 
behavior which involves an amount of resources, either in case or in kind, received by the 
agent(s) without any ex-ante consent of the principal(s) and in turn hurts the interests of 
the principal(s). The Principal-Agent Model is used as the based of the analysis and is 
applied to Hong Kong construction instruction. Four types of principal-agent 
relationships in the construction industry in Hong Kong are identified. 
 
By theoretical analysis based on mathematics, factors affecting corruption behavior are 
illustrated. They include the expected profit of the parties, the probabilities of being 
discovered, length of the trace back period for corruption, the time in which the monitor 
retires, the payment method and the number of persons involved. Corruption is feasible if 
the maximum bribe willing to offer by the developer is larger than the minimum bribe 
willing to accept by the monitor. And there would be an optimal size and pattern of 
distribution of the persons in different contractual levels which the probability of being 
discovered of the corruption act is smallest.  
 
 v
Hong Kong construction industry favors corruption because of its lengthy and 
complicated construction process, complexity and uniqueness of the output and its 
fragmented structure. They contribute to the number of principal-agent relationship and 
asymmetric information.  
 
Four Hypotheses are set based on the theoretical analysis and are subjected to empirical 
testing. The result shows that corruption in the industry would concentrate in the process 
in which it is hard to be discovered without a close scrutiny or would be discovered until 
a long time after the work is finished. Corruptions that hurt the interest of a company 
directly and in the more present future will be discovered a shorted period than otherwise.  
 
A land mark corruption case in Hong Kong construction industry, the 26 Public Housing 
Blocks Case, is further studied and the facts in the case comply with the theoretical 
analysis. This gives a further affirmation to the discussion. 
 
Recommendations are given at the end of the dissertation to lessen corruption in Hong 
Kong construction industry. Reforms on three areas are suggested, which are system 
reform, law reform and contract reform.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General Introduction 
Corruption has been a non extinctive phenomenon in the society since ancient times. 
There is no exception in such a developed city like Hong Kong. The corruption behavior 
was even regarded as a “necessary evil” in Hong Kong in the sixties and seventies. At 
that time, the Government, while maintaining social order and delivering the bare 
essentials in housing and other services, was unable to satisfy the insatiable needs of the 
exploding population. This provided a fertile environment for the unscrupulous.  
 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was established in February 
1974 to fight this serious social problem. Its mission is to fighting corruption through 
effective law enforcement, education and prevention to help keeping Hong Kong fair, just, 
stable and prosperous. Together with related Ordinances which include the Prevention of 
Bribery Ordinance (Cap 201), the ICAC Ordinance (Cap 204) and the Elections (Corrupt 
and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance (Cap 554), the corrupt atmosphere was much lessened. 
Nevertheless, the devil can never be annihilated. The number of corruption reports in 
recent years still maintain at a high level (Fig. 1.1). 
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Construction Industry has been a disastrous sector of corruption. The construction sector 
and the building management sector contribute 39% of the total corruption reports in 
recent years (Fig. 1.2). This is a huge figure as construction industry only contributes an 
average of less than 6% to the Gross Domestic Product of Hong Kong in the same period2 
(Table 1.1). The corruption behavior in the industry affects its reputation and public 
safety. Landmark cases include the 26 public housing blocks case during 1986 to 1988 
and the substandard pilings in Tin Chung Court in 2001. The major areas which 
corruption breeds include the award of contracts, site supervision, substandard works and 
personnel management. The coverage of corruption is wide which ranged from the top 
management to the on-site workers. Common cheating methods in the industry include 
using false measuring tapes, fake concrete delivery dockets and fake piling and testing. 
                                                 
2 Year 1998-2002 
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Fig. 1.1: Number of Corruption Reports (1990-2002) (Election Excluded) 
 
       Source: Independent Commission Against Corruption 
 
Fig. 1.2: Corruption Reports of Private Sector (1998-2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Source: Independent Commission Against Corruptio 
          Source: Independent Commission Against Corruption 
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Table 1.1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Economic Activity at Current Prices  
Percentage Contribution to GDP at Factor Cost 
Economic activity  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002# 
Agriculture and fishing  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Mining and quarrying  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Manufacturing  7.3 6.4 6.0 5.7 5.8 5.2 4.5 
Electricity, gas and water  2.6 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Construction  5.7 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.2 4.9 4.4 
Services  84.3 85.1 84.9 85.3 85.7 86.5 87.5 
Wholesale, retail and import/export 
trades, restaurants and hotels  
26.8 25.7 25.0 25.2 26.4 26.7 26.9 
Wholesale and retail trades  4.6 4.3 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.6 
Import/export trade  18.5 18.0 18.3 18.2 19.6 20.1 20.7  
Restaurants and hotels  3.7 3.5 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.7 
Transport, storage and communications  9.8 9.1 9.2 9.6 10.2 10.2 10.6 
Transport and storage  7.1 6.7 7.0 7.6 8.0 7.8 8.2 
 
Communications  2.6 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 
Financing, insurance, real estate and 
business services  
25.5 26.5 24.6 23.9 23.7 22.5 22.2 
Financing and insurance  11.1 11.1 10.5 11.9 12.7 12.1 12.2 
Real estate  10.1 10.7 9.5 7.4 6.3 5.9 5.6  
Business services  4.4 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.5 
Community, social and personal services 17.2 17.4 19.3 20.9 20.5 21.8 22.2 
Ownership of premises  12.7 13.5 14.2 13.8 12.6 13.1 13.2 
Adjustment for financial intermediation 
services indirectly measured  
-7.7 -7.1 -7.4 -8.0 -7.8 -7.9 -7.7 
GDP at factor cost  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
‘0.0’ Less than 0.05%. 
# Figures are subject to revision later on as more data become available. 
Source: Censes and Statistics Department  
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1.2 Objectives 
In this dissertation, three objectives are set: 
 
1. To investigate the economic nature of corruption in Hong Kong construction 
industry; 
 
2. To study the corruption behavior in Hong Kong construction industry; and  
 
3. To give recommendations to lessen corruption in Hong Kong construction industry. 
 
1.3 Organization and Methodology 
 
1.3.1 Organization 
In the first part (Chapter 1), a general introduction to corruption in Hong Kong 
construction industry is given. Objectives of the dissertation are set and its organization 
and methodology is stated.  
 
In the second part (Chapter 2 and 3), a literature review on the economic aspect of 
corruption is carried out. The definition of corruption is then set to make the later analysis 
clear.  
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In the third part (Chapter 4), the operation of the construction process in Hong Kong is 
introduced in order to give a basic understanding of the industry to readers. 
 
In the fourth part (Chapter 5 and 6), an economic model on corruption—the 
Principal-Agent Problem Model is then introduced and applied to the construction 
industry. Based on the model, further economic analysis on corruption behavior in the 
industry is carried out.  
 
In the fifth part (Chapter 7 and 8), four hypotheses on the corruption behavior in Hong 
Kong construction industry are then set and they are subjected to empirical testing. 62 
corruption cases in the industry in the past are used as the raw data. A landmark case in 
Hong Kong construction industry—26 Public Housing Blocks Case is then used as a case 
study to further examine whether the facts in the case comply with the theoretical 
analysis. 
 
In the sixth part (Chapter 9), recommendations to Hong Kong construction industry and 
the government are given in order to lessen the corruption behavior in the industry. 
 
In the seventh part (Chapter 10), a conclusion and an evaluation of the dissertation are 
given. 
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1.3.2 Style and Manner 
This dissertation is written according to the style and manner prescribed by Turabian3 
(1996), the Chicago University’s Manual of style for theses. 
 
1.3.3 Methodology 
 
1.3.3.1 Literature Review 
The study will count on literature review, which means a review of books, commentaries, 
journal articles, newspaper cuttings and government policy. This is especially important 
in defining corruption as without a clear definition, the theory cannot be wrong and 
becomes tautology.  
 
1.3.3.2 Economic Analysis 
A classical economic model of corruption—Principal-Agent Model is applied to Hong 
Kong construction industry and used as the base of the discussion. The Principal-Agent 
Model provides clear assumption and illustration of corruption and hence further 
economic analysis is able to carry out in a stringent manner. Economic analysis of 
corruption behavior is based on mathematics derivation. Mathematics is clear and 
accurate. Through equations, the effect of a particular variable on the others can be 
                                                 
3 Turabian, K. L. (1996) A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
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predicted easier. 
 
1.3.3.3 Regression 
Regression analysis is used for the empirical test of the data duplicated from 62 
corruption cases in Hong Kong construction industry in order to justify the hypotheses set. 
It is a statistical methodology that utilizes the relation between two or more quantitative 
variables so that one variable can be predicted from the other, or others. Functional 
relationships among variables can be investigated by regression. 
 
1.3.3.4 Case Study 
A Landmark corruption case in the Industry—26-Public Housing Blocks Case is used as 
a case study for further illustration of the corruption behavior in the industry. If the facts 
in the case comply with the theoretical analysis, it gives an additional affirmation to the 
discussion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Model of Perfect Competition 
It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine the existence of corruption in a perfect 
competitive market without government intervention. Following Stigler (1957), 
economists have adopted the following assumptions in the model of perfect competition: 
1. There is infinite number of economic agents in the market4. They may be 
consumers or producers. 
2. Economic agents are rational: “They are supposed to ‘know what they want’ and 
to seek it ‘intelligently.’”5 
3. There is perfect mobility of final products or factors of production: Not only 
there are no physical or artificial barriers of movement, but it is costless during 
adjustments or movements.6 
4. There is perfect information: ‘There must be perfect, continuous, costless 
intercommunication between all agents of the society.’7 
                                                 
4Stigler, G., (1957) “Perfect Competition, Historical Contemplated,” Journal of Political Economy (Feb 57), 
65, 1, Reprinted in The Essence of Stigler (pp. 265-288) Hoover Institution Press.  
5 Ibid, p.277 
6 Ibid, p.277 
7 Ibid, p.278 
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5. The society is static: Neither population nor capital is increasing. Technology is 
not improving. Consumer preference is stable as well.8 
 
When the model of perfect competition is applied to product i.e. final output and factor 
i.e. labor and capital, which are factors of production, market, the conclusions are clear 
and elegant. Those germane to the analysis of corruption are quoted: 
First, price is determined at the point where supply and demand is equal in the 
corresponding market. In the absence of government intervention, market clears itself and 
there is no such a thing called “excess demand” or “excess supply” 
Second, competition ensures every producer earn zero profit.  
Third, workers are paid according to their marginal product.  
Fourth, price is equals to marginal cost. 
 
It is obvious that any kind of corruption (its definition will be discussed later) cannot be 
imagined to exist in the model of perfect competition. Perfect mobility (assumption 3) 
ensures that any institutions, including government, in the economy, cannot establish any 
entry barrier and in turn monopoly power in any industry. Producer has no incentive to 
                                                 
8Stigler, G., (1957) “Perfect Competition, Historical Contemplated,” Journal of Political Economy (Feb 57), 
65, 1, Reprinted in The Essence of Stigler (pp. 265-288) Hoover Institution Press., p.276 
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bribe government for any privilege, permission or operation license. What is more 
important is at the market clearing condition, the producer can sell whatever quantity it 
wants at the prevailing market price since by assumption 1, its relative small size 
compared with the market suggests it has negligible influence on market price and 
quantity transacted.  
 
Neither do employees have any room for accepting bribe, given there is perfect 
information. If employees receive bribes from consumers for selling the goods at a price 
below the market one, employers will know it for sure (because of perfect information) 
and therefore fire the employees. With perfect information, the employers can guarantee 
that the behavior of the employees is always for, not against, their interests.  
 
2.2 Corruption in Real World 
 
Yet, corruptions do exist in real world. The fact that the perfect competitive model fails to 
explain corruptions does not imply the absence of the latter. Indeed, when the 
assumption(s) in the perfect competitive market is released, there is room for corruption 
to step in.  
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Government is one of the sources for corruption. Through government intervention, there 
can be a lot of corruption opportunities. These interventions include subsidy (such as 
export subsidy) or tax (for example, tariff), entry barriers (including occupational licenses, 
residential restriction in labor market, land zoning), price or quantity control (price 
ceiling, price floor and quota are prominent examples). To some extent, such 
interventions also consist of government’s monopolization of certain goods and services, 
such as the issue of passport and identification documents9. 
 
Let us illustrate with entry barriers. Government, with its huge judicial and regulatory 
power, can effectively invent and maintain entry barriers. The existing producers enjoy 
monopoly power, which means they can charge a price higher than the marginal cost 
without the threat of entrants which drives down the price. Such entry barriers will result 
in monopoly profit, which does not exist in the perfect competitive market.  
 
Most economists believe that government officials’ decision of establishing explicit or 
implicit entry barriers is neither arbitrary nor irrational. Since an effective entry barrier 
will yield a monopoly rent to the producers, the latter will have incentive to persuade the 
                                                 
9Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1993) “Corruption,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (Aug. 93), 108, 3, 
599-617. 
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government to work for their interests. In other words, the imposition of entry barrier is 
not exogenous to the economy or industry. There are indeed many methods through 
which the producers can influence the government policy and enjoy a monopoly rent. 
Lobbying through “purchase of politicians”, preparation and submission of policy 
proposals etc. is, according to the “Public Choice” school10, the most important way of 
striving for this entry barrier. Tullock (1967) begins the rent seeking analysis with 
application on tax and tariff. Stigler (1971) carries out a similar study to illustrate that the 
establishment of occupational licenses is dependent on several variables, such as the 
lobbying power and income of the lobbying groups. International trade theorists also 
incorporate the endogeneity of protectionistic trade policy as an illustration for the 
Directly Unproductive (DUP) Activities. Among all, Anna Krueger (1974) was the 
profession to develop a formal model to analyze the lobbying for quotas and tariffs. The 
next decade was followed by a flourishing of the research in these renting seeking or 
equivalently, DUP activities11. 
                                                 
10 For a detail review on public choice rent-seeking literature, see Tollison, R.(1982) , “Rent Seeking: A 
survey,” Kyklos 35 (Fasc 5), pp. 575-602. 
11 For a detail review on DUP activities, see Bhagwati et. al, (1984) “DUP Activities and Economic 
Theory,” In D. C. Colander (Ed) Neoclassical Political Economy: The analysis of Rent-seeking and DUP 
activities (pp. 17-32) Cambridge Mass.: Ballinger 
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The above hypothesis that profit or wealth maximizing individuals will lobby for 
favorable government policies is also applicable to other forms of intervention like price 
ceiling and import quotas etc.  
 
Lobbying is not the only way that producers can bargain for such policies. One effective 
way is to offering monetary incentives to government officials in return for favorable 
policies. This is corruption. Cheung (1996) even argues that “many controls and 
regulations are implemented or maintained with only one real purpose in mind: to open 
up opportunities for corruption.”12 
 
As Lui (1996) has pointed out, when government sets a price ceiling below the market 
clearing price, excess demand will emerge and it sometimes requires official rationing. 
People are willing to pay more than the prevailing artificial market price and will bribe 
the government officials for some backdoor privileges in order to purchase the goods. 
Similar arguments can also be found in Cheung (1996).  
                                                 
12Cheung, S. N. S. (1996) “A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption,” Contemporary 
Economic Policy (Jul. 96), 14, 3, 2 
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Besides government opportunity, another indispensable prerequisite for corruption to take 
place is imperfect information. To be precise, it is asymmetric information that provides 
corruption opportunities. Asymmetric information refers to the situation in which one 
side has private information which is not revealed to or cannot be discovered by the other 
side during the transaction or execution of a contract. In the classical example by Akerlof 
(1970), if a car owner sells a used car, he knows the quality of the car because he has 
used it, the potential buyers, however, cannot tell in prior the quality. Car owner cannot 
just claim the quality of his car, because talk is not credible. Such pre-contract problem 
owing to asymmetric information is called “adverse selection”.  
 
Consider another example: a shopkeeper who is hired by a shop owner and the latter does 
not monitor the works of the former owing to some unknown reasons. The shopkeeper 
does not care about the profitability of the shop but the money in his own pocket. His 
objective is different from that of the owner, who is to maximize profit. Since (1) 
objectives of them are different, (2) the shopkeeper’s objective is not link to that of the 
owner and (3) the shopkeeper is not carefully scrutinized; the shopkeeper will have 
incentive to deviate from what the owner’s point of view constitutes the optimal behavior. 
He will shirk during office hours; he may be careless in detecting shoplifting. He may 
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even make use of the company resources for his own gain (recall the example of Enron 
and other accounting scandals in the United States in 2002). Such post-contract problem 
arising from asymmetric information (in this case, the absence of supervision and the 
employer does not know what the employees are doing) is called “moral hazard” or 
“Principal – Agent problem” (P-A problem hereafter). Not all contracts will be subject to 
this P-A problem, because people will design the contract in a way to remove it. Yet, 
there are still possibilities for corruption basing on asymmetric information. 
 
The concepts of adverse selection and P-A problem have caught the attention of 
contemporary economists, and the focus of researches in the past two to three decades are 
mainly on the implication of asymmetric information on labor contracts and companies’ 
incentive structure.13 
 
Many economic models accounting for corruption are constructed on the basis of the P-A 
problem. For example, Becker and Stigler (1974) offers a solution for corruption by 
constructing a paid structure similar to a deferred bond. The corruption these authors are 
discussing is that kind of government corruption that cannot be “discovered after years”. 
Obviously the corruption in the analysis of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) involves 
                                                 
13 See Stiglitz (2001) for a summary 
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asymmetric information as well – officials sell the goods produced by the government 
without returning a price to the government and any potential penalty. So far the article 
by Jain (1998) is the most outstanding review article on corruption basing on asymmetric 
information.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION 
 
3.1 Definition of Corruption 
 
Defining the term “corruption” is an indispensable but uneasy task. It is indispensable 
since the focus of this paper is corruption and a seemingly trivial mistake or deviation 
may be fatal to both theoretical construction and empirical estimation. The importance 
also lies in our purpose of model construction in explaining corruption is to yield testable 
implications that can be refuted by facts14. As Coase (1960), Nobel Prize winner of 
economics in 1991, put forward: “Not being clear, it was never clearly wrong.” Without a 
clear definition, our theory cannot be wrong and becomes a tautology, depriving all of its 
predictive power: It is possible to manipulate the theory such that it seems to explain 
everything successfully. Hopefully with a clear definition, the potential tautological 
problem can be avoided. 
 
It is uneasy because many researchers indulging in the studies of corruption have tried to 
define corruption, but at the same time, they fail to give one persuasive or clear definition 
of corruption. Most of them are competent researchers and this is beyond doubt. Their 
                                                 
14 Friedman, M. (1935) “The Methodology of Positive Economics”, reprinted in Essays in Positive 
Economics, Chicago Press, pp 3-43. 
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failures to define such a commonly used term should not be overlooked. A portion of the 
rest was apparently not aware of the importance of the definition and thus gives vague, 
tautological (such as “corruption is what is called corruption” by Brasz (1970)) or even 
no definition at all (such as Tullock (1996)).  
 
Instead of defining corruption in a way that can be applied to all existing and forthcoming 
models on corruption, which seems to be an ambitious but insurmountable task, 
corruption in this article refers to the behavior which involves an amount of resources, 
either in case or in kind, received by the agent(s) without any ex-ante consent of the 
principal(s) and in turn hurts the interests of the principal(s). In other words, when 
agent(s) receives money or other returns which he/she is not obligated to take because it 
is not stated in the contract or in any format of approval given by the principal, and the 
agent(s) behaves in the way that will reduce the benefit or exaggerate the loss of the 
principal, corruption occurs. Still, this definition is not clear enough in the sense that 
terminology including “principal” and “agent” is neither defined nor elaborated. 
“Principal” is the economic unit, maybe a person, a group of professions etc., which hires 
or pay another unit, to complete some tasks for the principal. The unit who is hired is the 
“agent”. In a firm, for example, the firm owner can be viewed as the principal, who hires 
the workers, who can be treated as agents, to work. Notwithstanding the conceptual 
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difficulty in defining the relationship of “who hires who” (Cheung (1983)) i.e. it is 
sometimes impossible to determine who is the “boss”, a legalistic approach will be 
adopted (Coase (1937), pp. 53-55).  
 
The difficulty in distinguishing between the principal and the agent should not be 
overlooked and deserve a thorough elaboration. Coase (1937), Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) explained the existence of firms with the notion of transaction cost and shirking 
respectively: Team production or cooperation improves efficiency and productivity, 
leading to a higher output (holding other things constant). Yet, according to Coase, it is 
difficult to determine each member’s contribution to the total output and costly for buyers 
will coordinate all the team members. According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), each 
member in the team will shirk without a close monitoring and the output from 
cooperation will be smaller than the team optimal one. These authors’ conclusion is the 
same: An external person will step in, responsible for coordinating and monitoring the 
performance of each member. This “external person”, who is selfish, will not perform the 
work voluntarily. Instead, he will pay each member a wage and collect the payment from 
selling the good produced by the members. The difference between the receipts (from 
selling the good) and payments to the workers will be his return. This is how firm arises 
and the “external person” is treated as the firm owner or the principal. Nice story, but 
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Cheung (1983) argued that it is conceptually insurmountable in deciding who hires who: 
Are the team members hiring the “external person” or the other way around? From the 
prospective of economic modeling, both views of “who hires who” will give us the same 
conclusion: Firm exists. No researchers, to the author’s knowledge, have overcome this 
conceptual problem.  
 
3.2 Corruption and Rent Seeking Activities 
 
Recalling our definition for corruption is the behavior which involves an amount of 
resources, either in case or in kind, received by the agent(s) without any ex-ante consent 
of the principal(s) and in turn hurts the interests of the principal(s). This particular kind of 
behavior is obviously distinguishable from what the public choice theorists including 
Buchanan (1990), Tullock (1967) and Tollison (1982) called rent-seeking activities. The 
agent does not receive benefit from the lobbyist – economic units use non-price 
competition, mainly through the political process, to compete for privileges, monopoly 
power and other favorable measures. More importantly, from a social perspective, the 
main and the most significant difference between corruption and rent seeking activities is 
that putting aside the costs incurred in corruption process (for example, negotiation, 
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maintenance and operation of the process)15, corruption does imply a transfer of payment 
only whereas renting seeking activities, however, are not wealth- or resource-transferring 
but they indeed used up real resources.  As Anne Krueger (1974) argued that 
“individuals compete for the rights to import (under a quota scheme) in order to win the 
monopoly rents that derived from them and that such activities are a loss to society.” In 
public choice terminology, though it is not the first best allocation method (that is the 
market mechanism using price), corruption is still second best and preferable to the 
rent-seeking activities, in the sense that less real resources are “wasted”16.  
 
It does not follow logically, nor do we intent to imply that corruption is something good 
and should be encouraged. Neither do we connote the undesirable nature of corruption. 
Whether something is good or bad belongs to normative analysis, while a positive 
analysis is adopted in this essay i.e. we concern what will be (positive) but not what 
should be (normative). We leave the desirability of corruption to social philosophers, 
educators and other professions that have absolute and comparative advantage over us. 
Recall the purpose of this paper is to “explain why corruption is so common in 
construction industry”. Even we may recommend solutions for corruption in the last 
                                                 
15 Cheung (1983) has called these costs Transaction costs, being costs that are not conceived to exist in a 
Robinson Crusoe (one-man) economy.    
16 See Buchanan (1980) for a detailed analysis. 
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chapter, we take the undesirability of corruption for granted without doubting its validity. 
In other words, we answer the question of “what to be done if society believes corruption 
is bad and should be eliminated” instead of answering “is corruption really bad” or those 
kinds of subjective, moral-based or normative questions.  
 
3.3 Corruption in the Construction Industry 
 
As far as our focus industry – construction is concerned, we believe the problem in 
defining principal and agent does not arise, as the principal-agent relationships are crystal 
clear: The first, the homebuyers are principals, delegating the government officials or 
other monitoring agents to ensure the quality of the constructions. The latter groups, 
being agents, have diverted objective from the former group i.e. they do not care much 
about the quality of building. What they care are their own interests (may be monetary 
return such as bribes or non-monetary return such as shirking); in the second one, the 
shareholders of a construction company are the principals, where the managers and 
employees are agents. The shareholders’ objective is to develop high quality construction 
with standardized materials. Again the latter group concerns only with the money in their 
own pocket. Because of high monitor cost (Alchian and Demsetz (1972)) or/and 
incomplete contracting (Williamson (1987)), it is impossible to ensure the agents work in 
accordance with the objective of the principal perfectly. This creates incentives for 
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accepting bribe. Such principal-agent relationships are particularly useful when we go 
through the following chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4 
OPERATION OF HONG KONG CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
 
Since our model focuses on corruption in Hong Kong construction industry, it would be 
helpful to overview the construction process in the industry before introducing the model. 
With such a summary, we may be able to point out the operation that leads to corruption 
in later part. 
 
4.1 Construction Process17 
Basically, a construction process can be divided into the following four stages: 
 
1. Inception stage  
This stage consists of clients’ project initiatives, assessments of project profitability and 
other subject matters that clients would consider. The clients are usually private property 
developers, or may sometimes be government. Other considerations include project 
requirements, acquisition of land, setting up of project team, and appointment of project 
manager.  
                                                 
17 Idea taken from Rowlinson, S. M. & Walker, A. W. (1995) The Construction Industry in Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong: Longman. 
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2. Conceptual stage 
Once clients decide to implement the project, professions in the construction industry, in 
this case architects and engineers would purify and concretize the initial concept of the 
client. They will jointly propose an outline of the design including general proposals for 
the project such as form, layout, height and floor area. An overall assessment on the 
technical and functional feasibility of the project will be carried out. Outline proposal is 
then drafted.  
 
3. Design stage 
The concept is further developed into a constructable design. Production information and 
contract documentation would be prepared. Different tasks in this stage are allocated to 
different professions: 
z The Architect is a design professional. He is responsible for the creation of a 
detailed design which meets the specification of the client.  
z The quantity surveyor on the client’s side is responsible for taking off the 
quantity of materials needed for the project from architects drawing. Bills of quantity 
is then prepared for the tendering.  
z Registered Engineers are responsible for the structural design and also the design 
of the building services. 
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4. Contractual stage 
Tenders for construction are called for in this stage. Quantity surveyors evaluate the 
tender and report to architect/engineer who recommends suitable contractor to the client. 
For the tendering process, see page (7) below. Client then signs a contract with the 
successful bidder, which is the main contractor. The contract between the clients and the 
main contractor, which is called “main contract” hereafter, usually includes the following 
constituents: 
• Main Contractor’s obligations 
• Statutory obligations, notices, fees and charges 
• Materials, goods, and workmanship to conform to description, testing and 
inspection 
• Variations, provisional and prime cost sums 
• Contract sum 
• Materials and goods, unfixed or off-site 
• practical completion and defects liability 
• Extension of Time 
• Loss and expense caused by disturbance of regular progress of the works 
• Determination by Employer 
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• Determination by Main Contractor 
This list of contractual items is not exhaustive. A more comprehensive list can be 
found in Annex 1. 
 
5. Planning stage  
The main contractor is responsible for project planning. It prepares a program for the 
project and mobilizes resources for construction on site. Subject to the approval of the 
client or terms and conditions in the contract, main contract may divide the whole project 
into some small and manageable ones, and subcontract to other contractors. Usually, 
tendering will also be adopted for selection of subcontractors. Main contractor and 
subcontractors transform the production information into a physical facility. All materials 
used and workmanship must follow the specifications and requirements provided in these 
contracts between the main- and sub-contractors. These specification and requirement 
must be in line with those in the main contract. Cost of them have to be followed those 
stated in the submitted tender. The required construction time is also stated in the contract. 
If the contractor cannot complete the work within the time limit, liquidated damages 
would have to be paid.  
 29
6. Construction stage 
Physical construction is carried out on site, in accordance with the contracts. Inspection 
on the construction quality is usually carried on as construction is in process. Members of 
the design team supervise construction. Project manager issues payment certificates 
periodically on the recommendation of the quantity surveyor. He also arranges and 
presides over site meeting. The architect also has the overall control and administration of 
the documentation and the construction of the project. He has the power to give 
instructions and make variation orders to contractors. Besides, he has the responsibility to 
inspect contractor’s work and grant extension of time to the contractor. During the 
construction stage, the client’s quantity surveyor would also assist the architect in 
inspecting and measuring the work of the contractors in order to issue payments to the 
contractor.  
 
Upon the completion of the building, the authorized person applies for an occupation 
permit which is granted by the Buildings Department after the equipment and 
installations of the building have been inspected and tested. An application for a 
Certificate of Compliance from the Lands Department is required after more stringent 
tests at a later date. In additional, the whole construction process is not ended after the 
physical completion of the buildings. The contractor makes all faults becoming evident 
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during the defects liability period. Quantity surveyor prepares the final account for the 
project. 
 
7. Operation and maintenance stage 
The completed buildings or works are maintained, repaired or altered as required, over 
the course of their life. A professional estate management consultant may be retained by 
the client.18 
 
For illustrative purpose, the whole process is shown in Fig. 4.1.  
                                                 
18 See page 35 for more details about administration for alterations and additions to buildings 
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Fig. 4.1: Traditional Construction Process in Hong Kong 
 
Inception 
Detail design 
Outline proposals 
Scheme deign 
Feasibility 
Production information 
Project planning 
Tender action 
Bills of quantities 
Construction 
Inspection 
Operation and maintenance 
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4.2 Contractor Selection Process19 
Awarding contracts to contractors is one of the major areas where corruption happens. 
There are two ways for contractor selection, which are tendering and negotiation.  
 
4.2.1 The Tendering Process 
The tendering process can be summarized by two questions: (1) Who can submit a tender? 
(2) Which criteria should be used to select a contractor/ subcontractor? 
 
The first question refers to the participation process. There are two methods in deciding 
who can submit a tender. The first one is called open tender. In an open tender, all 
contractors are able to summit an offer. In principle, this is the fairest method since no 
one is discriminated in the participation process. However, as the project becomes 
smaller in size, in terms of either denominated value or capital involved, this method 
becomes costly since many small contractors or subcontractors will be managed to handle 
the project and therefore participate in tendering. The administration cost associated will 
increase tremendously. In particular, as the tender is open to all, the background of the 
                                                 
19 Idea taken from Rowlinson, S. M. & Walker, A. W. (1995) The Construction Industry in Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong: Longman 
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contractors, such as experience and reputation, is costly or even impossible to be ensured. 
Contractors’ overheads are increased and building costs are inflated due to large number 
of abortive tenders. 
 
The other method is called selective tendering. The project manager draws up a list of 
contractors with certain experience and reputation and invites them to tender for the job 
only. The quality of the contractors is ensured. 
 
The second question refers to the selection process. The competitive tendering approach 
is usually adopted. This is a traditional method of selecting a contractor or subcontractor. 
Prospective contractors and subcontractors would offer a price for the project. Usually, 
the bid with the lowest tendering price wins the tender20. However, the bid with the 
lowest price does not necessarily represent the best value of money as only price here is 
considered. Moreover, the tendering price is unlikely equal to the final price due to 
variations during the construction stage. 
 
                                                 
20 In the literature of economics on auction, auctions can be classified into two types. In the first price 
sealed bid auction, also known as Dutch Auction, the winner who bids for highest price, wins the auction 
and pay for the price he/she bids; in the second price sealed bid auction, also known as English Auction, the 
winner who bids for highest price, wins the auction and pay for the price the second highest bidder bids. 
There is huge amount of literature showing that in expected sense, these two auctions should give the same 
amount of revenue to the seller. See Krishna(2002).  
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4.2.2 The Negotiation 
Negotiation is the process of arriving at a price for the construction of a project by 
agreeing a price with only one pre-selected contractor.  In other words, after the bidders 
submit their tender and proposal, one is selected for further negotiation. Price is a one but 
not the most important factor in selecting this bidder for further negotiation. Obviously 
the benefit of competition is lost, and it may be claimed that too high a price will be paid. 
However, the cost of selecting suitable tenders is reduced in the other hand. 
 
4.3 The Role of Government in the Construction Process21 
Government does not play a silent role in the whole construction process. It usually plays 
a regulatory role. The Government imposes various building and development control in 
order to ensure adequate safeguards of public interest and to promote common wealth. 
The development control is generally exercised through three different means: Conditions 
in land leases, the Town Planning Ordinance (Cap 131), the Buildings Ordinance (Cap 
123) and allied legislation. For lease control, the government exercises it by stipulating 
restrictions and conditions in the lease documents. They mainly concern the use of the 
                                                 
- 21 See Buildings Ordinance Office (1991) Building Control in Hong Kong, Government Printer. And  
Planning Department (1995) Town Planning in Hong Kong: a quick reference, Hong Kong: Planning 
Department and  
 35
land. Breach of lease conditions will initiate lease enforcement actions including re-entry. 
They are enforced by the law of contract. For town planning control, it is governed by the 
Town Planning Ordinance which provides guidance as to development control on 
planning aspects. 
 
Building control affects the construction process most. It is mainly governed by the 
Buildings Ordinance which the administration is vested with the Building Department. It 
provides a framework on various aspects which include planning, design, construction, 
associated works, safety and dangerous buildings. In addition to the Buildings Ordinance, 
there are subsidiary legislation detailing requirements under respective areas such as 
Building (Administration) Regulations, Building (Construction) Regulations, Building 
(Ventilation Systems) Regulations etc. 
 
4.3.1 Administration of New Building Proposals 
According to section 14 of the Buildings Ordinance, approval should be obtained from 
the Building Authority before the commencement of any building works. An Authorized 
Person has to be appointed by the client to act as the coordinator of the works. He has to 
be an architect, engineer or surveyor who is registered under section 3 of the Building 
Ordinance. Besides preparing the proposals, he has to assist the Buildings Department’s 
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officials regarding approvals, amendments, testing, inspection and upon final completion 
of work. All structural drawings and calculations submitted must be certified by a 
Registered Structural Engineer. He will also supervise and certify the quantity of all 
structural works during the construction and completion stages.  
 
There are two stages regarding the approval for new developments under the Buildings 
Ordinance. The first stage is the approval of development drawings and associated 
designs. Relevant government departments would involve in the approval. Fundamental 
aspects of the proposal such as density and safety would be checked. There are cases 
where the building design cannot satisfy certain provisions of the regulations. The 
authorized person can apply to the Building Authority for exemption and modifications of 
the Buildings Ordinance and regulations. The second stage of the process is application 
for consent to commence under section 13(1) (b) of the Building Ordinance. This 
application has to be submitted after the approval of the development plan. The consent 
to commence work is to make sure that the site is ready for construction.  
 
In the construction stage, the Authorized Person, Registered Structural Engineer and the 
Registered Contractor are responsible for the supervision of the work. Staff from the 
Buildings Department will also carry out periodic checking and testing. These may 
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include concrete cube testing, actual measurement, reinforcement testing, drainage testing 
etc. Relevant government departments would also involve. The Electrical and Mechanical 
Services Department will check on the lift and escalator installations. The Water Supplies 
Department will approve and check on completion of plumbing installation for a 
permanent connection of water main to be made. The Fire Services Department will 
approve and check on the installation and proper function of fire fighting equipment. The 
Drainage Services Department will check and connect the rain and foul water drains to 
public sewers.  
 
Upon completion of the construction work, according to section 21 of the Building 
Ordinance, an Occupation Permit may be issued by the Buildings Department upon 
satisfactory completion of all the building works and obtain the necessary documents. A 
Certificate of Compliance would also be issued by the Lands Department. These people 
are what we called “monitors” in the following chapters. Of course, the developers 
themselves will have internal staff for the checking of these items. The term “monitors” 
also includes these group of persons.  
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4.3.2 Administration for Alterations and Additions to Buildings22 
Approval may also be required for alterations and additions works to existing buildings. 
Alterations and additions works requiring approval include structural alterations, drainage 
works, ground investigations in the scheduled areas and site formation work. The 
procedures for these kinds of works are similar to new works. Plans and drawings have to 
be submitted to the Buildings Department for approval. Also, a Stability Certificate for 
the existing building must be summated. After the completion, a letter indicating 
completion of works will be issued by the Building Authority.  
 
 4.4 Discussion 
As we can see, the procedures of the construction process are long and complicated. A 
large number of parties including various professionals and authorities are involved. This 
creates a large number of Principal-Agent relationships and makes the problem of 
asymmetric information serious, hence favor corruption. The details would be discussed 
in chapter 5.  
                                                 
22 Ho, D.C.W. (1993) Maintenance Management of Aging Buildings in Hong Kong, Property Management 
(1993), 11, 3, 240-245. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 
 
5.1 Conditions for Principal-agent Problem23 
 
The principal agent problem refers to the situation under which owing to information 
asymmetry, the agents seek deviation in completing the task assigned by the principal 
during the execution of contract, but this deviant behavior is unobservable yet hurt the 
principal. In other words, conflict of interests arises when some tasks are to be completed, 
and the agents try to benefit themselves at the expenses of the principal.  
 
5.1.1 Division of Labor 
 
The necessary condition for principal-agent problem to arise is the division of labor. In 
other words, the principals and the agents must be separate entities: no agents will at the 
same time be principals, vice versa. Otherwise, when the agent gains at the expense of the 
principal, his/her loss as a principal is just compensated by the gain as an agent, leaving 
his/her overall resources allocation unchanged. If by definition the principal and the agent 
are the same person, the “principal-agent problem” becomes an empty and ridiculous 
concept. In the principal-agent problem, division of labor means tasks are assigned to 
                                                 
23 See Jain (1999) for a more detailed discussion 
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different agents by the principal, instead of the principal finishing the tasks himself. We 
are not going to investigate why the principals do not complete the tasks and those related 
question. It is taken for granted that there are tasks to be completed, and the principals 
assign the tasks to the agents. The compensation may or may not be related to the agents’ 
performance. Yet, these are of little significance. The important point is: we have division 
of labor in which the principal and agents are separate entities. 
 
5.1.2 Divergence of Objective 
 
Equally important for the principal agent problem is the divergence of objective between 
principal and agent. For example, under an employer-employee relationship, the former 
wants to maximize his profit:  
weYpe −⋅=Π )()(   
where eYp ,,,Π  and w  represent, profit, output price, output (which increases 
with effort), effort and wage to employee. 
 
The employee, however, wants to maximize the utility from wage and leisure, subject to 
the constraint that he can only spend his time endowment on either input or leisure:  
max  ),( LwU   s.t.  TeL =+   (U = utility) 
where L and T represent leisure time and total time available for allocation 
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respectively. 
Utility increases with wage and leisure. Wage can increase utility because the wage 
received allows the employee to consume goods. This setup makes utility indirectly 
decrease with effort input, assuming work itself (we are NOT referring to the wage from 
working) reduces the time available for leisure: 
0),( >
dw
LwdU , 0),( >
dL
LwdU  
 
Without an appropriate contracting mechanism linking effort and wage, the employees 
will just shirk by input no effort while working but can enjoy a wage which is 
independent of effort input. We have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: When Wwage =  where W is a constant and therefore 0=
de
dW , a 
utility maximizing employee will choose e = 0. 
 
Proof: Suppose a utility maximizing employee does not choose e = 0. It can be easily 
shown that by decreasing e, the employee can increase his utility by enjoying more 
leisure without any corresponding loss from wage, which is independent of effort. This 
violates the utility maximizing condition. In other words, employee is not maximizing 
utility by choosing e at a level other than zero.  
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Optimal contracting requires wage depends on effort input. That is, from the prospective 
of the employer, 
max  )()()( eweYpe −⋅=Π   s.t.  ULewU ≥)),((   
where U  represents the utility the employee can get for not taking this job. In 
this case, wage depends on effort.  
 
The employer maximizes profit by selecting an optimal effort input. This cannot be done 
by specifying a contract requiring a high effort input but paying zero wages in return 
since no employee will take the job. Optimization can only be implemented subject to the 
so-called participation constraints for the employee: From the employee’s prospective, he 
inputs effort in return for a wage. The wage, with a specific effort input, will be so 
selected as to ensure that the utility of the employee for taking this job, )),(( LewU  will 
not be worse off )),(( LewU  than otherwise, U .  
 
In particular, suppose e  solves the optimization problem above. The constraint 
( ULewU ≥)),(( ) must be binding in the sense that the inequality must become equality 
such that the employee is indifferent in taking the job or not. We have the following 
proposition: 
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Proposition 2: If effort is observable, the constraint ULewU ≥)),((  must be 
binding for the optimal e, defined as e . That is, ULewU =)),(( . 
 
Proof: suppose ULewU >)),(( . That is, the constraint is not binding at the profit 
maximizing e. This violates the definition of profit maximizing since at this so-called 
profit maximizing e, the employer can reduce the wage a little bit without changing the 
required effort input. First, worker will still take the job since the decrease in wage is 
very small. Second, the profit will be higher, since cost is lower by the reduction in wage 
payment. This establishes proposition 2.  
 
In conclusion, the second necessary condition for the principal agent to arise is the 
divergence in objective. Unless a contract can be made to such a way that the interest of 
the principal and agent is the same, otherwise, principal-agent problem, or in this case 
shirking will result.  
 
5.1.3 Asymmetric Information 
 
The third condition is of course the existence of asymmetric information, in particular, 
when effort input is not observable. Without any asymmetric information, there can be no 
principal agent problem at all. In other words, if the principals can effectively measure 
the effort input of the agents, ensuring that the latter are working for the principal’s 
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interests and paying according to the effort of the employee. However, it is not costless to 
observe the effort input of the employee. Self-reporting of effort input by the employee 
must subject to lying and other frauds. It requires additional resources, such as a monitor 
to ensure effort is input. Yet it in turn requires another monitor to ensure that the first 
monitor is performing his task satisfactorily. Such viscous cycle (monitoring the monitor) 
can go on and on and it implies the cost for monitoring, which we define as the behavior 
for ensuring the effort is input, can be very huge. Not only is monitoring costly, it is often 
imperfect. If effort input is always proportional to output in a reliable and stable manner, 
principals can infer effort input from the output, and pay the wage according to the wage 
function. Yet, shocks and other unanticipated factors may occur. Therefore it is 
impossible for the principals to pay the employees by inferring the input from output. The 
asymmetric information due to costly monitoring and the existence of other factors like 
shock is another necessary condition for the principal agent problem to arise.  
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5.2 A Comprehensive Illustration of the Principal-agent Problem24 
Suppose the owner of a firm (the principal) wishes to hire a manager (the agent) for a 
project. The firm’s profits are affected, at least in part, by the manager’s actions. If these 
actions were observable as in 5.1, the contracting process is simple.  
 
As the effort of the agent, e, becomes unobservable, it is impossible to verify whether 
effort in input by definition. This makes the contract basing on observable effort input 
redundant or useless. The principal may have to re-design the scheme such that an 
optimal effort input i.e. an input level that is in this best interest is guaranteed. Extra 
incentive must be given to the agent. 
 
It is further assumed the manager’s effort must not be perfectly deducible from the 
observation of profit or output. Otherwise, from looking at the output, the principal can 
guess the effort and by such “reverse-engineering”, the principal will be able to determine 
the effort input. If this is the case, then the contract basing on observable effort still works. 
Realistically, we assume that although the project’s profits are affected by e, they are not 
fully determined by it.  Hard working people can have no output, while lazy people may 
be the ones to reap off.  
                                                 
24 Most of the notations and idea comes from Mas-colell et. al (1995). 
 46
y = f (e) + ξ.  
Output y(e) is increasing in effort, e. It will also depend on some random factor ξ, 
representing some non-effort random factor affecting output.  
 
To keep things simple, we restrict our attention to the case in which the manager has only 
two possible effort choices, eH and eL. We make assumptions implying that eH is a 
“high-effort” choice that leads to a higher profit level for the firm than eL but entails 
greater difficulty for the manager.  
 
Furthermore, we assume that the level of expected profits when the manager chooses eH 
is larger than that from eL. This is not really surprising or counter-intuitive, as higher 
effort should usually result in higher profit or output. 
 
The owner receives the project’s profits less any wage payments made to the manager. 
We assume that the owner is risk neutral and therefore that his objective is to maximize 
his expected return. The idea behind this simplifying assumption is that the owner may 
hold a well-diversified portfolio that allows him to diversify away the risk from this 
project. 
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Without going through the mathematics which is irrelevant for the present exercise, we 
just state conclusion from the principal agent problem as proposition 3: 
 
Proposition 3: In the principal-agent model with unobservable manager effort, a 
risk-averse manager, and two possible effort choices, it involves a larger expected 
wage payment to induce him to input high effort than is required when effort is 
observable. The optimal compensation scheme for implementing eL involves the 
same fixed wage payment as if effort were observable. Whenever the optimal effort 
level with observable effort would be eH, non-observability causes a welfare loss. 
 
It is a special feature of the two-effort-level specification in the model that 
non-observability leads to downward distortions in the manager’s effort level. With many 
possible effort choices, non-observability may still alter the level of managerial effort 
induced in an optimal contract from its level under full observability, but the direction of 
the bias can be upward as well as downward. 
 
Contract linking effort and wage can minimize welfare loss. In some circumstances, 
however, such contract does not work since it is impossible to observe the input of the 
worker and it is costly to examine or monitor the worker. Equally importantly, some 
 48
potential problems owing to shirking or less than optimal effort input do not arise until 
years later. Output in the construction industry might be fluctuating in the sense that 
random factor or “negligence” might play an important role in determining the output or 
the quality of output. It is very likely for the agents to attribute poor output due to the 
random factor. 
 
5.3 Principal-agent Problem and Corruption 
To understand the relationship between various definitions of corruption, we extend the 
principal-agent model. (Fig. 5.1) 
 
We call the populace the clients C1, C2 … Cn. These clients appoint the major agent, Ao, as 
their general agent to complete certain tasks. The duty of agent A0 is to look after their 
interests and to maximize their welfare. The agent Ao may also appoints some other 
agents, A1 … Am-j,, to complete the tasks. These relationships are outlined in Fig. 5.1. All 
the agents, A0 as well as A1 … Am-j, are assumed to maximize their own welfare rather than 
be pathologically honest towards their principals. 
 
There are two principal-agent relationships, the first one between the clients C1 … Cn and 
the agent A0. There are incentives for all the agents to ignore the interests of their 
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principals and maximize their own welfare at the cost of these principals.  
 
The second agency relationship arises between A0 (as the principal) and A1 … Am-j (as the 
agents). This relationship meets the requirements for a classic information-asymmetry 
based agency problem. Agents A1 … Am-j have incentives to extract more benefits from 
their own benefits, and even re-orient the goals of these tasks. To avoid too abstract 
discussion on principal agent and corruption, we examine the corruption model in Hong 
Kong construction industry directly. 
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Fig. 5.1: Principal-Agent Relationships in an economy 
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Source: Jain(1999) 
 51
CHAPTER 6 
THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL IN  
HONG KONG CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
 
There are several possible principal agent relationships in the industry that may give rise 
to the corruption problem: 
 
6.1 Home Purchaser – Property Developer  
The home purchasers buy properties from the property developers. This can be viewed as 
the property developers construct the properties on behalf of the home purchasers, 
overview and monitor the construction process, in return for a profit between the selling 
price and construction cost. The purchasers’ objective is to ensure that first of all, the 
property is in line with the safety guidelines and safe for the intended purposes. Second, 
the materials used for the construction and other quality dimensions of the property are in 
expectation or stated according to the contract. The developers, however, may be tempted 
to construct flats with materials with lower quality, and try every single way that benefits 
themselves at the expense of the purchasers.  
 
 
 52
6.2 Home Purchaser – Monitor  
In view of the first potential problem, outside monitors may be hired to check against 
various things – safety, quality of construction material etc. Whether it is the property 
developers or purchasers who hire them is of little significance – though since there is 
economies of scale for hiring such monitors, it is the property developers that hire them. 
In particular, the average cost for performing these checking duties is decreasing as 
number of users increase. In other words, when the monitors are consumed concurrently 
by many home purchasers, the cost can be spread to many. The cost of checking for each 
home purchaser can be lower.  
 
6.2.1 Illustration of the Economies of Scale 
The total cost for constructing a certain number of properties is 
)()()( YMYCYTC +=  
where Y is amount of properties to be constructed, TC is total cost, C is construction 
and related costs, and M is monitoring cost. This is the case when the monitor is hired by 
the developer on an aggregate basis. Assuming that Y is homogeneous of degree smaller 
than one such that 
)(2)2( YMYM ⋅<            (1) 
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That is, when the amount of properties increases by double, the cost of monitoring will be 
increased by less than double. If this is the case, if the monitor is hired by the property 
developer, the average cost for each flat will be
Y
YMYCYAC )()()( += .On the other hand, 
if each individual purchaser of the Y properties hires their own monitor and the property 
developer saves this cost, the average cost for each individual purchaser will be 
)1()()(1 MY
YCYAC += . In this case, the total cost for constructing and monitoring Y 
units of properties will be higher as  
)()()()1()()()( 11 YTCYMYCMYYCYACYYTC =+>⋅+=⋅=  as 
Y
YMM )()1( >  by (1) above. 
 
These monitors play a role in the construction industry similar to that of outside (yet not 
strictly independent) auditors in the financial market. Auditors are supposed to safeguard 
the interest of small investors by acting as a watch dog to the listed corporations against 
falsifying financial statements. Similarly, monitors in the construction industry are to 
guarantee that the properties the investors purchased are “genuine” and follow the safety 
requirements. 
 
Having said that they are supposed to protect the interest of investors, it is quite often to 
discover that the auditors seem to play a role that favors the corporation instead of the 
 54
investors. A series of accounting scandals were unveiled in 2002 involving corporations 
like Tyron, World Communications, and the most prominent one, Enron. These 
catastrophic scandals have led Enron to the verge of bankruptcy. Many people attribute 
this to the fact that it was the corporations, instead of the investors that selected and 
therefore controlled the auditors. Auditors are money-looking, and if they are effectively 
selected by the corporations, their independent will be undermined, as many people 
claimed. We believe such allegation is misfired, it does not matter whether it is the 
corporation or the investors that select the auditors. There is a famous theorem in 
economics called “Coase Theorem”, which is named after its founder, Ronald Coase: 
“Resources allocation will be identical regardless of initial right assignments, given 
transaction costs are low enough.” The essence of this theorem is that institutions play a 
negligible role in resources allocation. Applying Coase theorem into the accounting 
incidents, it means that if information is perfect (in the sense that the performance of the 
auditor are known), the stock prices would not be affected by different selection method 
(by either corporations or investors). Of course, these auditors are supposed to minimize 
the principal agent problem. Yet, they collude with the agents and make the 
principal-agent problem unsolved! This is also an indirect evidence support our earlier 
claim that monitoring is always imperfect. 
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Similarly, in construction industry, monitors are seldom selected by home purchasers. For 
economies of scale reason elaborated above, these monitors are usually selected by either 
property developers or the Government. These monitors are supposed to safeguard the 
interest of property purchasers. However, owing to division of labor, lack of technical 
knowledge and information asymmetry, it is hard for the property purchasers to evaluate 
the monitors’ performance. In other words, when their performance is so difficult to be 
evaluated, they may switch their effort to other activities for monetary return. Since no 
one recognizes their under-performance, they might offer a bribery opportunity for the 
property developer: “You pay me this amount, and regardless of the materials you used 
for construction, your property will pass through the quality check for sure.” In view of 
such offer, the property developers may substitute poor for better qualities materials in 
construction, and pay a bribe for passing the quality check.  
 
6.2.2 Amount Bribe Willing to Pay by the Developer 
 
In general, the substitution ratio for cost saving and bribery is not on a one-to-one ratio. 
That is, developers are not willing to pay the saving costs in bribery payment, unless the 
corruption is risk-free: 
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MQICIYQP HHH −−⋅=Π ),()()(  
where ),()()( HHH QICIYQP −⋅=Π  denotes the profit to the developers when 
using materials with high quality HQ . Price )(QP  that the developers can charge 
obviously depends on the quality of materials and price increases monotonically with 
quality of inputs 0
)( >
dQ
QdP
. We assumed there are only two levels of quality, 
)( HQP > )( LQP , that is, high quality properties have a price larger than that of low 
quality property. Assumed that the quantity that the developers can sell does not depend 
on the quality on materials, and all the effects of higher quality materials are reflected in 
the price. Output Y , maybe amount of flats available for sales, depends on quantity of 
input I , which is distinguished from the quality for illustrative purposes. Cost 
),( HQIC  increases with amount and quality of inputs, 0
),( >
H
H
dQ
QIdC  
and 0),( >
dI
QId H . Finally, it is necessary for the developer to hire an outside monitor to 
ensure the quality of the flats. The associated cost is M , which is assumed to be 
independent of the amount of output (and therefore input) and quality of materials25. 
Without paying this M, the property will not pass the quality checks and the constructions 
will be perceived as construct with low quality materials, regardless of the actual ones. 
The price the developers can receive will be )( LQP  with )( HQP > )( LQP ; and the 
                                                 
25 The assumption that M is independent of amount of output is controversial. For simplicity purpose, the 
assumption here is made. The conclusion does not change by dropping this assumption. 
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developers cannot break even for sure. That is  
0),()()( <−⋅=Π HL QICIYQP  and 0),()()( <−⋅=Π LL QICIYQP  
 
Suppose with the asymmetric information, the monitor can offer such a corruption 
opportunity to the developers (again, the conclusion does not change by making the 
developer offer such an opportunity to the monitors). With a side payment B in addition 
to the monitor payment M, the monitor passes through the test regardless of the quality of 
materials used in construction. In this case, people will be “cheated” or misinformed and 
pay )( HQP  for each property. But such corruption is not risk-free, with probability (1-q) 
the corruption will be discovered, and people will know that the flat is constructed with 
low quality materials and therefore pay )( LQP  for each property. Given that the 
developer is  
z maximizing the expected profit; and 
z risk neutral 
The maximum amount of side payment (or bribe) B it is willing to pay will be such that its 
expected profit will be the same as in (1) not taking the corruption opportunity, construct 
the property with high quality materials and earn HΠ and (2) the expected profit for 
paying the bribery and use materials with lower quality, i.e.,  
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MQICIYQP HHH −−⋅=Π ),()()(   and  
BMQICIYQPq
QICIYQPqE
LH
LLC
−−−⋅⋅+
−⋅⋅−=Π
)],()()([
)],()()([]1[)(
       (2) 
are equal. M and B must be paid once corruption option is taken, regardless of the 
result. Then, 
BMQICIYQPqQICIYQPq
MQICIYQP
LHLL
HH
−−−⋅⋅+−⋅⋅−
=−−⋅
)],()()([)],()()([]1[
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)]}()([)()1{()],(),([ HLLH QPQPIYqQICQICB −⋅⋅−+−=  
The maximum bribery B, is equal to the sum of two terms: cost 
savings )],(),([ LH QICQIC − , which is positive, and possible profit 
loss )]}()([)()1{( HL QPQPIYq −⋅⋅− , which is negative. In other words, the bribery will 
never exceed the cost savings. If we assume that firms will face some extra penalty when 
being discovered for corruption (may be compensating the property purchaser etc.), then 
B will be even lower.  
 
It does not necessarily follow that for any q, Expected profit )( CE Π in equation (2) net of 
B must be positive. That is, even bribery is zero, it may not be profitable for the 
developers to switch to use low quality materials. If this is the case, the monitors have to 
give a bribe to developers to induce the latter to use low quality materials. Since monitors 
have no benefit from allowing the developers to use low quality materials, they are not 
willing to bribe the developers by making a negative bribe. In order words, if equation (2) 
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net of B is negative for a given q, )( HQP  and )( LQP , there is no chance for any 
corruption. 
 
6.2.3 Amount Bribe Willing to Accept by the Monitor 
We have not considered the decision of the monitor – it may not be in his benefit to 
accept/offer a bribe since there is a possibility that corruption will be discovered and he 
will lose future income. Suppose that if not corrupted, he can receive a wage equal to NW  
for T periods (say, this is the number of years before he retires). With a discount rate β , 
the present value for this stream of cashflow is: 
∑
=
=
T
t
n
t WW
1
β   
 
If he takes the opportunity to receive bribe, he can get a bribery payment equal to B. 
Again, following the notation above, there is a probability (1-q) that corruption will be 
discovered and he will loss the wage thereafter. Unlike the case for developer26, there is a 
trace-back period for corruption. That is, if corruption take places in period i, the 
anti-corruption authority can trace back corruption after j periods. In other words, in i + j 
period, the monitors may also face a probability of being caught for corruption. If this is 
the case, given that the monitor is  
                                                 
26 The developer is assumed to be one period only, i.e. the company will dissolve after each project.  
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z maximizing the expected income; 
z risk neutral; 
z Except the wage NW , there is no other cost (such as jail) for being discovered for 
corruption; and 
z Alternate wage for corruption is zero 
z The number of trace-back period is J.  
 
If a monitor takes bribe, his expect income will consist of the following: In period 1 
where he takes the bribes, with probability (1-q) he will be caught for corruption, and 
probability q he is not, and can enjoy an income equal to NW  + B. The incomes in 
period 1 have to be discounted by the factor β , with β  larger than zero but smaller than 
1. In period 2: (1) given that he is caught for corruption in period 1, he will get zero for 
his alternate wage; (2) given that he is not caught for corruption in period 1, he will have 
a probability of q(1-q) that he will be caught for corruption, and probability q2 he is not, 
and can enjoy an income equal to NW . The incomes in period 2 have to be discounted by 
the factor 2β , with β  larger than zero but smaller than 1. This process will go on and 
on until in period J+1: (1) given that he is caught for corruption in any one of the 
preceding periods, he will earn a wage equal to zero; (2) given that he is not caught for 
corruption in any of the preceding periods, he can earn wage equal to NW  for sure until 
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period T. Mathematically, the discounted expected profit will be: 
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He will be indifferent in (1) rejecting a bribe and (2) taking a bribe with an amount B, and 
facing a chance of being caught for corruption if 
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The B such defined can be viewed as a minimum amount that the monitor is willing to 
accept for making a corruption offer.  
 
Equation (3) has certain empirical implications that conform to intuition: 
z If J, the number of trace back period, increases, the amount of bribe B has to be 
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increase to make sure that the monitor takes the bribe since the second and the last terms 
in equation (3) is decreasing in J. That is 
0][
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d ββ . 
 
Increasing trace back period makes it more costly to take a bribe in terms of the potential 
wage loss. People with corruption can be traced back to earlier periods, which makes 
monitors with corruption face a wage loss. In order to break even, the amount of bribe 
must increase to compensate the potential wage loss due to increase in trace back period. 
z If q, the probability that corruption will not be caught, increases, the bribe amount B 
that makes the monitor break-even will decrease. This is because 
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This is not surprising as q decreases, it necessarily implies that it is less costly to take 
bribe since it is less likely that monitor accepting bribes will be caught for corruption. To 
break-even, the amount of bribe B, has to decrease. 
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z If T, the period in which the monitor retires (or the amount of period in which he quits 
the job as a monitor), increases, B has to increase to make sure that the monitor takes the 
bribe as 
0]})1[(])1({[
11
0
>−+− ∑∑ −
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If the monitor takes the bribe, his potential wage loss will be larger with a larger T since 
once caught for corruption, the monitor would loss the wage for longer period. To 
compensate this loss, B, the amount of bribe must increase. 
z For a reason similar to the previous one, an increase in wage, NW , will lead to an 
increase in B, that is the amount of bribe must increase in response to an exogenous 
wage increase. 
 
6.2.5 Is Corruption Profitable? 
Putting distribution of profit from corruption aside, as is obvious from equation (2) and 
(3), corruption will be profitable to the developer and monitor if and only if the joint 
profits after corruption is not less than the joint profit without corruption: 
∑∑
∑
+==
=
++⋅⋅+−−−⋅⋅+
−⋅⋅−≤+−−⋅
T
Jt
n
Jt
J
t
n
tt
LH
LL
T
t
n
t
HH
WqWqBqBMQICIYQPq
QICIYQPqWMQICIYQP
11
1
})],()()([
)],()()([]1{[]),()()([
βββ
βββ
27  (5) 
                                                 
27 For keeping a consistent time period, the profit for developers are discounted by β .  
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Hence, equation (5) is the necessary but not sufficient condition for corruption to occur. 
The GAIN in corruption would equal to the different of the two sides of equation (5): 
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The GAIN in corruption is increasing with q. This is perhaps not very surprising, since 
increasing in q will result in a lower expected loss of wage and a large expected gain 
from corruption and cheating.  
 
6.2.3 Lump-sum or Installment Payment? 
Suppose given a specific amount of bribe, B, it is profitable for the monitor to take the 
corruption opportunity. He can choose either take the bribe in a lump-sum basis i.e. 
receive a payment equal to B in this period, or divide the whole bribe into F payments, 
each with an amount equal to S.  We call the former option “Lump-sum” while the latter, 
“Installment”. The present value of the installment will be just equal to the lump sum 
method by the following formula: 
∑
= +=
F
t
t
SB
1 )1( β  
Given that these two options give the present value, which option will he take, 
Lump-sum or Installment? Assume that: 
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z the monitor accepts a bribe; 
z the probability of being caught for corruption (1-q) is independent of F and PB ;  
z the number of trace-back period is J; 
z the monitor maximizes the expected income; and 
z the monitor is risk neutral 
 
A rational monitor will prefer to receive a Lump-sum payment, instead of Installment for 
a bribery because: 
 
If he opts for the lump sum payment, the present value of the cash flow after taking 
account of being arrested of corruption would be: 
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βββ   which is exactly equation (3). 
 
If he opts for the installment payment by dividing the bribe B into F payments in each 
period equal to S, the present value of the cash flow would be: 
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Combining equations (3) and (6), it is obvious that  
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The intuition is pretty simple: in both methods, the present values (net of the probability 
of being arrested for corruption, (1-q)) are the same. Yet, by choosing the installment 
method, the total number of period which the monitor could be arrested for corruption 
will be F + J28, while for the lump-sum method, J. It follows that after taken into account 
of this long trace back period, the discounted expected case flow under the installment 
method will be smaller than that of the lump-sum method. This is the reason why for 
most of the time, even if other payment methods are available, people will opt for a lump 
sum method in corruption. 
 
                                                 
28 As the receiving of bribe would left clues for the investor 
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In other words, given that the monitor agrees to corrupt, it is not in his interest to select 
the installment method, given that the present (yet Not expected) value of the two 
methods are the same. This is one further implication from equation (4). 
 
6.3 Corporation (stockholders) – Employee  
The owners of a developer, mainly stockholders, want to maximize the profit from selling 
properties; for the main contractor, it wants to ensure that the work is completed in 
accordance with the contract. The officers in a developer corporation or main contractor 
may want to fur their own nets at the expense of the corporation’s resources and 
stockholders’ return. This is the most classic principal agent problem. They may select 
tendering participants with illegal commissions in selecting contractors (and for main 
contractor, this happens in the process of subcontracting) and materials suppliers who 
give bribes. They may also carry out other corrupt acts are not easily observable. This 
scenario is similar to point 2, so it is not repeated in great details. 
 
In particular, there are several ways which the employees can benefit themselves during 
the construction process. First, it can be done through tendering. Note that in Chapter 4 
we have mentioned that there are two ways of allocating a contract via tendering, one 
uses bid price as sole criteria, the other using bid price as well as other non-price criteria 
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(discretion of management, past experience, reputation etc.) evaluated by the so called 
selection committee. When the latter method is used, there are rooms for corruption: One 
or even more bidder might want to pay the selection committee some money in exchange 
for a guarantee that it will obtain the contract. There is room for the selection committee 
to take bribe because criteria other than price are less objective and can be assessed 
according to experience and professional knowledge which are more subjective. In other 
words, when the latter approach is used as selecting tender, these “experience and 
professional knowledge” provide opportunity for corruption.  
 
So how does this corruption hurt the company or stockholder’s interest? Suppose that 
bidder A is sure to get the contract by offer to the company that the construction job will 
be completed by $1300. The cost of completing the task is $800 and it therefore earns a 
profit of $500. He would be satisfied with the profit and wants to earn more. Suppose 
now he can bribe the selection committee with an amount of $300. The bidder A will not 
be that stupid to give an extra $300 for something it will get for sure anyway. If 
corruption is risk free in the sense that it will not be discover anyway, he will make the 
bid higher by at least $300 such that his profit is larger after paying the bribe. That is, he 
will submit a bid with contract amount equal to at least $1600. Then the construction 
company is hurt because it needs to pay $300 more for the same job to be done. The extra 
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cost goes to the pocket of its selection committee during the selection of contractor. This 
is how we can link up definition of corruption (in Chapter 3), principal agent problem (in 
Chapter 5) and corruption together. This selection committee accepts bribes or side 
payment from outsiders in doing something that hurts the benefit of the company. 
 
6.4  Property developer – Contractors  
Sometimes the main contractor and sub-contractor may not work in principal-agent 
problem. They may collude together, construct the properties in a below standard manner. 
Quite often, all the agents in the construction process (developer, main contractor, 
sub-contractors, and monitors) will collude together in corruption to cheat the home 
purchaser. In this section, we discuss the probability of not being caught for corruption, q.  
 
So far q is exogenous and independent of all the variables in the discussion: the amount 
of bribe and frequency of taking bribe does not affect this q; changing the profitability of 
corruption does not change q. Such assumption, though unrealistic, helps simplifies a lot 
of complexities than may other arise in some issues. However, in dealing with other 
issues, it is impossible to treat q as exogenous while giving meaningful implications and 
conclusions. In particular, consider the relationship of q and the number of agents 
involved in corruption. 
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The number of agent exerts a certain effect on q. On one hand, q may decrease with 
agents involved in corruption. There may be several reasons accounting for this: when 
more agents are involved in the process, more “members” join the corruption activity, 
and given that they have an interest in the corruption process, they are less likely to report 
the corruption even when they know it actually happens; more agents involved in 
corruption may help concealing corruption-related information, thus decreasing the 
probability of being caught for corruption. In pre-inquiry sense, that is, before someone in 
the corruption process is being suspected by the anti-corruption authority for accepting or 
giving bribes and being “invited” for an inquiry, the probability of not being caught for 
corruption actually increases. On the other hand, in the post-inquiry sense, that is after 
someone in the corruption process is being suspected and invited for an inquiry, it is more 
likely that the corrupted people will confess for corruption, and in turn other people 
involving in corruption are arrested as well. This is in fact the result of the famous 
prisoner’s dilemma in Game Theory in economics. In other words, q may decrease as the 
number of agent increases.  
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6.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma: Illustrating Probability of not being Caught is Decreasing 
in the Number of Person Involved in Corruption 
Consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose two persons are involved in 
corruption. The anti-corruption authority does have some information on this corruption, 
but they do not have sufficient evidence to charge against these two persons. In order to 
gather more information, they prosecute both of them and put them into two separate 
rooms for inquiry. Communications are blocked such that these two persons do not know 
what each other is telling the anti-corruption authority. Each of them has two strategies to 
follow: they can either confess or deny. Once confessed, the person will disclose all 
information concerning corruption; if denied, he will just keep his mouth shut without 
disclosing any information. Their payoff after inquiry depend not only whether he 
himself confesses or denies, but also the strategy chosen by the other guy: If both of them 
confess, the anti-corruption authority will have sufficient information to charge them. 
Each will face some punishment. Each of them incur a loss equal to, say -4; if either of 
them confesses, the anti-corruption authority will help reducing the penalty for the one 
who confesses, and punish the one not confessing more seriously. The payoff for confess 
is, say -2, and for deny, -8; If both of them deny, the authority will let them go after 
detainment. Payoff for each of them is -1. The payoff matrix is illustrated as follows: 
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 Person 2 Confess Person 2 Deny 
Person 1 Confess (-4,-4) (-2,-8) 
Person 1 Deny (-8,-2) (-1,-1) 
 
 
In each payoff, the first number belongs to the payoff to person 1, and the second number 
is the payoff to person 2. That is, the bracket (-2,-8) means that if person I choose confess 
and person 2 choose denies, the payoff to the former will be -2, and the later, -8. 
 
The two person would choose to collude only if the game is played infinitely as it is 
possible that both of them will deny yielding a lower loss29.And it is obvious that if this 
game is played once, each will have strong incentive to choose confess: Although the two 
persons have promised to deny beforehand, there is still a risk for any one of them to 
confess. This is because the one who confesses would have a gain of 2 (4-2) and the one 
who keeps deny would suffer a further loss of 4 (8-4). Both of them would not likely to 
take the risk and would rather betray the other since there will not be any future 
opportunity to collude. In reality life has no take-two. Hence the probability of resulting a 
profitable collusion would not be a hundred percent even they have made a promise to 
deny. Further more, the probability of resulting profitable collusion will decrease when 
                                                 
29 See Gibbons (1992) . A primer in game theory New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
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the number of person involved in corruption increases. In other words, as the number of 
persons involved in the corruption increases, when caught for inquiry, it is more likely 
that one of them will confess and provide all information concerning corruption. All other 
persons in turn get hurt.  
 
In conclusion, the number of persons involved has two opposite effects on the probability 
of not being caught for corruption, q. It is reasonable to assume that q is a function 
exhibits hyperbola or inverted U-shape: It increases and then decreases with the number 
of agents involved in the corruption. In other words, as number of agent involved is small, 
the effect of the pre-inquiry will outweigh that of the post-inquiry, and probability of not 
being caught for corruption increases as number of agent increases. The probability will 
reach the peak at a specific number of agents. At this specific number of agent, the 
probability of not being caught for corruption is the highest, but probably still smaller 
than one. Afterwards, as the number of agent increases, the probability of not being 
caught for corruption will decrease, reflecting the post-inquiry outweighs the pre-inquiry 
effect.  
 
Suppose there are three kinds of agents that can involve in the corruption process, 
developer, contractors and monitor. Let D, C and M be the number of developers, 
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contractors and monitors involved in the construction process respectively. The above 
implies that 
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The conclusion here is, the number of person will not increase infinitely. There would be 
an optimal corruption size which q attains maximum. Moreover, the pre-inquiry effect of 
adding an extra agent from new field (suppose the agents involve developers and 
contractors only and now a monitor is added to the corruption process) is larger than that 
from the same field (adding a new agent from either developer or contractor). And the 
optimal amount of person for a corruption process involving persons from the same 
contractual level will be smaller than in a corruption process involving persons from 
different contractual level. This is because there is greater division of labor from 
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collecting and concealing the information on corruption for adding a person from another 
field.  
 
How to show that these two effects do exist? We left this task to next chapter (see 
hypothesis 4 in chapter 7).  
 
6.5 Why is Corruption so Popular in Construction Industry? 
As discussed in the first part in this Chapter, the Principal-Agent problem leads to 
corruption. The second question is then raised: Why is Corruption so popular in 
construction industry?30 The Principal-Agent problem exists in almost every industry as 
there are employers and employees, what makes the construction industry different? The 
nature and characteristics of the construction industry and how they are related to 
corruption would be discussed in the following section. Basically there are three 
characteristics of the industry making it vulnerable to corruption, which are its lengthy 
and complicated construction process, complexity and uniqueness of output and its 
fragmented structure. 
                                                 
30 As quoted in Chapter 1, construction industry contribute 4.4% of HK’s GDP in 2002 but the corruption 
reports in the construction and building management sectors contribute 39% of the total reports.  
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6.5.1 Lengthy and Complicated Construction Process 
The construction process is lengthy, which usually last for a few years. It is also 
complicated in the sense that it involved various professional skills such as architecture, 
engineering and surveying. The lengthy and complicated process resulted in serious 
asymmetric information in the production process as no single person can be familiar 
with every detail in the production. The observability of the effort input is low as it can 
be hardly deduced by the output and the monitoring is costly. 
 
6.5.2 Physical Characteristics of Construction Output31 
Construction product shares similar characteristics of capital goods. They are large and 
heavy, complex and expensive. Moreover, they are unique. The uniqueness and 
complexity give rise to asymmetric information. Consumers do not have a clear picture of 
what the product should “look like” as there is no comparable in the market. And as the 
product is complex, customers are hard to examine every detail of the product to check 
whether they comply with the contract. They provide gaps for corruption to exist. Even 
some of the elements are sub-standard, they are hard to be discovered. Besides, as the life 
cycle of the construction products are long, which last for at least a few decades, 
                                                 
31 For more details, refer to Hillebrandt (1984) 
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problems would usually arise a long time after completion. This reduces the risk of 
undertaking corruption. 
 
6.5.3 Fragmented Structure 
The construction industry is sometimes described as a fragmented industry (Chau and 
Walker (1995)). There are two types of fragmentation.  
 Vertical Fragmentation 
 Horizontal Fragmentation 
 
6.5.3.1 Vertical Fragmentation 
Vertical fragmentation refers to the large number of different parties involved in the 
process. The practice of division of labor is extensive and lots of professionals participate. 
The process of design and build is separated. There are at least two separate contracts and 
organizations, one for designing the product (the client side) and one for constructing the 
product (the contractor side). The vertical fragmentation is essential to the industry in the 
sense that the output of the industry is complex which requires inputs from different 
specialists. Division of labor also leads to cost efficiency. The unique nature of the 
construction output implies that the design process merits separate arrangement. However, 
the vertical fragmentation creates asymmetric information through out the construction 
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process. The effort of each individual is hard to measure as there are many parties 
involved. People rely too much on professionals also leads to the same problem. It is hard 
to evaluate the output of the specialists, providing opportunities for the professionals to 
shirk via corruption.  
 
6.5.3.2 Horizontal Fragmentation 
There are a large number of small firms (about 20,000 establishments) in the market 
(Table 6.1). A single project involved a large number of subcontractors at different layers. 
The reasons for the existence of a large number of small firms are that there is no barrier 
to entry the industry. The capital requirement is low especially for labor only 
subcontractors. There is also a barrier to growth due to the licensing and grading system 
adopted by the public sector32. The selective tendering system adopted in the private 
section also prohibits the growth. Besides, there is a natural barrier due to differences in 
technological and financial capability, experience and good will between small and large 
firms. Because of the large number of small firms, the competition between them is 
vigorous. In order to bid for job, contractors would try every method to lower their tender 
price. However, the profit margin of them is already very low. Hence, in order to survive, 
                                                 
32 Hong Kong Housing Authority established Performance Assessment Scoring System (PASS) and the 
Maintenance Assessment Scoring System (MASS) to assess the performance of contractors. 
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corruption is one of the ways, although it is illegal. The sub-contracting system adopted 
in the industry creates more opportunities for corruption in the industry. This practice 
benefits the industry in the sense that there is a division of labor as well as sharing of 
risks and liabilities. The transaction cost is reduced as the number of contract for the 
costumers is reduced. But as the more levels present in the construction process, the more 
principal-agent relationships are created. As discussed in Chapter 5, corruption happens 
within the principal-agent relationship. The more the number of principal-agent 
relationship, the higher chances for corruption to exist. 
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Table 6.1: Principal Statistics for All Building and Civil Engineering Establishments 
HK$ million, unless otherwise specified 
  
Number of 
establishments 
Number of 
persons 
directly 
engaged 
Compensation 
of employees 
& payments to 
labour-only 
sub-contractors
Consumption 
of materials & 
supplies; fuels, 
electricity & 
water; & 
maintenance 
services 
Value of 
sub-contract 
work rendered 
by fee 
sub-contractors 
Miscellaneous 
operating 
expenses 
1998 19 404 155 906 56,955 49,081 111,427 21,780 
1999 20 233 157 685 54,361 45,545 104,687 20,843 
2000 20 181 154 676 53,007 42,958 92,965 17,915 
2001 19 521 141 079 48,480 38,845 90,247 16,737 
2002 19 878 135 870 45,197 36,962 86,102 16,309 
        Source: Censes and Statistics Department 
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CHAPTER 7 
EMPIRICAL TESTING 
 
Every model should be subject to empirical testing. There is no exception to this study. 
 
7.1 Regression Analysis 
Various approaches can be used for analyzing multifactor data. The most commonly used 
method is regression analysis. It is a statistical methodology that utilizes the relation 
between two or more quantitative variables so that one variable can be predicted from the 
other, or others. It provides a conceptually simple method for investigating the functional 
relationships among variables. And it is always expressed in the form of an equation or a 
model connecting the response or dependent variable and one or more predictors or 
independent variables.  
 
7.2 Data and Hypotheses 
There is no well-summarized and published dataset on corruption in construction industry 
in Hong Kong. We therefore have to rely on other information source. In the website of 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) (www.icac.org.hk), information for 
many cases concerning, among others, construction industry can be found. We are able to 
trace back 62 cases from year 2004 to year 1999. For each case, we collect the following 
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information: 
• Nature of the case: This refers to the corruption nature or the stage in the construction 
process in which corruption occurs. We broadly classify the cases into four categories: 
(1) awarding contract (in the process of tendering), (2) short piles, (3) forging report 
and lax supervision, and (4) counterfeit materials. 
• Person involved: Different kinds of persons, classified by their job responsibilities, 
are involved our corruption cases: (1) senior management, (2) professional (architect, 
engineer, designer etc.), (3) clerical staff, (4) site workers, (5) construction foreman 
and (6) laymen. 
• Number of persons involved. 
• Contractual level: This refers to the stage of construction process in the corruption 
occurs. May it occur at the (1) Government department, (2) consultant of client, (3) 
main contractor or (4) sub contractor.  
• Amount of bribe: This refers to the amount of bribe involved, denominated in Hong 
Kong dollars. It is the aggregate amount of bribe, which is the summation of all 
bribery in the case. However, detail breakdown showing the amount of bribe for 
different people is not known. 
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• Time to discover: This refers to the number of months between the time when 
corruption took place and the time when prosecution is made. 
The empirical tests will base on this dataset. Out of these 62 cases, only 41 of them had 
all these information. Such a sample size is sufficient for most of the econometric 
analysis. Request has been sent to the ICAC for more details on these cases and more 
importantly, information for cases in earlier period. Owing to confidential problem, ICAC 
replied that they could not offer more information. The official reply from ICAC is 
included in Annex 2. For these 62 cases, a detail summary for each of them can be found 
in Annex 3.   
 
It is necessary to establish hypothesis basing on the model in chapter 6. And there are 
four hypotheses to be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: if our model on corruption is correct, corruption in the construction 
industry must concentrate in the process in which (1) it is hard to be discovered 
without a close scrutiny; or (2) it would be discovered (regardless by whom) until a 
long time after the work is finished.  
To consider how we can come up with hypothesis 1, recall that the corruption probability 
depends on the probability of being arrested for corruption in page 58. Equation (2) tells 
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us that the higher the probability of not being caught for corruption, holding other things 
constant, and the larger the gain for corruption. There will be large incentives for people 
to corruption. 
 
This in theory works pretty nice. In reality, however, we do not know how people 
determine the probability before they corrupt. In other words, an ex-ante formulation of 
expectation is not possible. We therefore have to rely on information to formulate any 
ex-post probability of corruption. In such a short period of time for the cases (2 to 3 
years), this probability should not change by a large extent, and therefore past 
information is quite reliable for formulating future probability or expectation on certain 
events.  
So what affects the probability of being caught for corruption? If the corruption involves 
the construction materials that are related to the safety of the property but is not 
observable to end users, it will tend to have a lower probability. End-users, who act as 
principals to delegate the construction work to the developers or contractors (the agents), 
have no way of observing the “effort” of the agents. If this is the case, corruption 
involving the use of materials of lower safety quality will be more likely to happen. Not 
until a decade or even more can the end-users discover that they are “cheated” for 
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purchasing a property with low quality materials. Recall the “Tofu” construction in 
Mainland China and those public housings constructed in 70s in Hong Kong. People 
unveil that these constructions were made of low quality materials that will endanger life 
only after serious accidents. 
 
On the other hand, if corruption involves materials that are relatively observable to end 
users, such as the accessories, windows, and other things related to appearance, end-users 
are more likely to discover this. These end-users usually do not know this involved 
corruption. They just report to the press or consumer authorities for follow up action. It is 
suspected that there should be some ways the corruption authority, in particular ICAC in 
Hong Kong, to uncover these matters. Investigation in these cases would usually result in 
prosecution. If this is the case, then the probability of not being caught for corruption 
involving counterfeit materials will be much lower than that involving short piles.  
 
How to estimate probability? Unless we know the total number of cases involving these 
two kinds of corruption (one involving short piles, one involving counterfeit materials) 
over the same period, there is no way that we can estimate the probability by just 
knowing the number of corruption cases with prosecution or legal action. We have to use 
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other method. 
 
Following Stigler (1971), it is justified for estimating the probability with the time period 
between corruption and prosecution. In our case, we restrict our sample to corruption 
involving either short piles, being unobservable, or counterfeit materials, being 
observable. Out of the 61 samples, we have 13 cases concerning nature 2(short piles) and 
4 (counterfeit materials) with information about the time between corruption and 
prosecution. Since nature is a dummy variable, the command “xi” is used in the Stata 
program for estimation. Time is regressed against nature. If our hypothesis is true, then 
the dummy variable associated with corruption involving short piles should be positive.  
 
As is expected, from the result in Table 7.1, the dummy coefficient associated with 
corruption involving short piles is positive and statistically significant, with a t-value of 
4.98. In other words, holding other factors constant, nature 2 corruption would be subject 
to a longer period of time between corruption and prosecution. That is, the probability of 
being caught for nature 2 corruption is lower than that for nature 4.  
 
Moreover, as shown in Table 7.2, the corruption amount failed to influence the period of 
time between corruption and prosecution. The coefficient is negative and equal to 
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0.0002436, that is, for $1,000 increase in corruption amount, the time between corruption 
and prosecution increases by 0.0002436 months. This is contrary to expectation, which 
from our model implies the corruption amount itself has nothing to do with the time 
between corruption and prosecution. Nevertheless, t-statistics for this coefficient is very 
small, implying that the coefficient is not different from zero, conforming to our idea.  
Hypothesis 1 conforms to evidence. 
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Table 7.1: Regression result of Regressing Time against Corruption Nature (2, 4) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 opened on:   8 Mar 2004, 21:43:11 
. xi: regress  time_month i.nature if nature == 2 | nature ==4 
i.nature          _Inature_1-4        (naturally coded; _Inature_1 omitted) 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      13 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    11) =   24.77 
       Model |  1077.45238     1  1077.45238           Prob > F      =  0.0004 
    Residual |  478.547619    11   43.504329           R-squared     =  0.6925 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6645 
       Total |     1556.00    12  129.666667           Root MSE      =  6.5958 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  time_month |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     (95% Conf. Interval) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  _Inature_2 |    18.2619   3.669554     4.98   0.000     10.18527    26.33854 
  _Inature_3 |  (dropped) 
  _Inature_4 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   39.16667   2.692716    14.55   0.000     33.24004     45.0933 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. log close 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 closed on:   8 Mar 2004, 21:45:36 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 7.2: Regression Result of Regressing Time against Amount of Bribe 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 opened on:   8 Mar 2004, 21:46:32 
. regress time_month amount_thousand 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      38 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    36) =    0.35 
       Model |  52.3204716     1  52.3204716           Prob > F      =  0.5595 
    Residual |  5429.49532    36  150.819314           R-squared     =  0.0095 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0180 
       Total |  5481.81579    37  148.157183           Root MSE      =  12.281 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  time_month |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     (95% Conf. Interval) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
amount_tho~d |   .0002436   .0004135     0.59   0.560    -.0005951    .0010823 
       _cons |   29.10622   2.240895    12.99   0.000     24.56148    33.65097 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. log close 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 closed on:   8 Mar 2004, 21:47:05 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Hypothesis 2: if our model on corruption is correct, following hypothesis 1, the 
amount of bribe involved in nature 2 corruption (short piles) will be larger than that 
of nature 4 (counterfeit materials). 
 
From equation (5) in Chapter 6, The GAIN in corruption would equal to the different of 
the two sides of equation (5): 
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and it would be increase with q. 
As the gain of the corruption cases would not be known. We have and other assumption 
here, which the gain in a particular corruption would be in proportion to the amount of 
bribe, which is known. This seems contradict to equation (4) in Chapter 5 as 
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The amount of bribe required by the monitor would be decrease as q increase. Yet, B only 
illustrates the minimum amount required by the monitor, in a corruption which the gain is 
high, the developer would will to offer a higher bribe. The possible bribe amount would 
exist between the maximum amount the developer willing to offer and the minimum 
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amount the monitor willing to accept. (Fig. 7.1) 
Fig. 7.1 Possible Bribe Amount in Corruption 
 
The actual amount of bribe in the “contract” would depend on the bargaining power of 
the both parties. Nevertheless, for simplicity, we assume the amount of bribe is 
proportional to the total gain in the corruption. 
 
It follows that since nature 2 corruption is less likely to be discovered by ICAC, the gain 
in the corruption should be larger and hence the gain. 
 
Unfortunately, out of the 15 cases on nature 2 and 4 corruption, only six of them have 
information on the corruption amount. The average for nature 2 corruption is $970,000 
(two samples), and that for nature 4 corruption is $5,642,000. The large average for 
Maximum amount willing to offer by the Developer 
Minimum amount willing to accept by the Monitor 
Amount of 
Bribe 
Possible amount of Bribe 
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nature 4 corruption is attributable to a sample with extra large amount ($16,800,000).  
Owing to the small sample size, the great difference in average amount of 
corruption between the nature 2 and 4 corruptions at best is only a small piece of 
evidence support hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Corruptions that hurt the interest of a company directly and in the 
more present future will be discovered a shorter period than otherwise.  
People care about their money now more than that in the future. Corruption in the form of 
either 1) tendering or 2) sub-standard quality will hurt the interest of a construction firm: 
by accepting a tender that is not for the best interest of the company, the company is hurt 
now as the tender with the highest bid is rejected. Whereas if the building is constructed 
with sub-standard materials (corruption among contractors), following hypothesis 1, the 
sub-standard parts would be likely to be “implicit” or “unobservable” that will not be 
discovered until years. At that time, new property buyers will cease to purchase the 
properties.  At that time, the developers may need to compensate the property owners 
for using substandard materials. The loss occurs in the future. Though the developers 
want to reduce both kinds of corruption (in tendering and in using substandard materials), 
they put more effort to deter the first kind of corruption. In other words, they will ensure 
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that tendering process is corruption-free. Given this, corruptions involving substandard 
materials will be discovered much later than those involving tendering. 
 
If this is the case, then the corporations have the strongest incentive to detect corruptions 
concerning tendering; less against those concerning observable materials, the 
construction materials; and least against those concerning unobservable materials, in our 
case, the short piles. The time between happened and arrest for the first kind of 
corruptions will be the shortest, and the longest for the last kind of corruptions. 
 
The estimation results are shown in Table 7.3. On average, it took (29.84) months to 
discover the corruptions tendering (nature 1); It took an extra (9.33) months, which is 
statistically significant, to unveil corruptions involving observable materials (nature 4); 
Uncovering cases related to short piles (nature 2) on average required 29.84+9.33+27.58 
months = 66.75 months, close to 5.5 years.  
 
To sum up, hypothesis 3 is supported by facts. 
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Table 7.3: Regression Result of Regressing Time against Corruption Nature (1, 2, 4) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 opened on:   8 Mar 2004, 21:45:24 
. xi: regress  time_month i.nature if nature == 1 | nature == 2 | nature ==4 
i.nature          _Inature_1-4        (naturally coded; _Inature_1 omitted) 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      45 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    42) =   21.83 
       Model |  4469.81141     2   2234.9057           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4300.76637    42  102.399199           R-squared     =  0.5096 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4863 
       Total |  8770.57778    44  199.331313           Root MSE      =  10.119 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  time_month |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     (95% Conf. Interval) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  _Inature_2 |   27.58482   4.222373     6.53   0.000     19.06373    36.10591 
  _Inature_3 |  (dropped) 
  _Inature_4 |   9.322917   4.501834     2.07   0.045     .2378482    18.40799 
       _cons |   29.84375   1.788847    16.68   0.000     26.23371    33.45379 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. log close 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 closed on:   8 Mar 2004, 21:45:36 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Hypothesis 4: The effect of increasing in the number of persons in different 
contractual level on corruption amount will be larger than that of number of 
persons in the same contractual level. 
 
It comes from equation (5) that holding other things constant, the amount of gain from 
corruption will be increasing then decreasing in the number of person involving the 
corruption process.) We do not know exactly the probability function with respect to 
number of person. But as shown in 6.4.1, the effect of persons from different field on 
corruption amount should dominate that of persons from the same field, since there is 
probability gain from “division of labor” in corruption, though both will give rise to a 
larger gain and in turn the corruption amount. 
 
To test this hypothesis, two separate tests were carried out. We first regress amount of 
corruption on number of persons involved (this is shown in Table 7.4); then regress the 
amount of corruption on number of contractual levels involved (this is shown in Table 
7.5). 
 
Both of the coefficients are positive, though they are at the same time statistically 
insignificant, implying that they are not different from zero. In particular, the coefficient 
 96
associated with number of contractual level is 706, implying that for an additional 
increase in a different kind of person involved in corruption (from another contractual 
level), corruption amount will increase by $706,000. The corresponding figure for that 
associated with the number of persons is only 208, implying that for an additional 
increase in the number of person (which we do not know whether he is from the same 
contractual level or not), the corruption amount will increase only by $208,000.  
 
With a larger number of cases, we can perhaps reduce the standard error of estimates and 
show that hypothesis 4 conforms to facts. At present, we can only at best say hypothesis 4 
is not supported by facts. 
 97
Table 7.4: Regression Result of Regressing Amount of Bribe against Number of Person           
Involved 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 opened on:   8 Mar 2004, 21:47:37 
. regress  amount_thousand no_person_involve 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      40 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    38) =    0.71 
       Model |  16430441.5     1  16430441.5           Prob > F      =  0.4035 
    Residual |   874937089    38  23024660.2           R-squared     =  0.0184 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0074 
       Total |   891367530    39  22855577.7           Root MSE      =  4798.4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
amount_tho~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     (95% Conf. Interval) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
no_person_~e |   207.9375   246.1528     0.84   0.404    -290.3728    706.2478 
       _cons |   1641.981    1147.98     1.43   0.161    -681.9834    3965.946 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. log close 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 closed on:   8 Mar 2004, 21:48:18 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 7.5: Regression Result of Regressing Amount of Bribe against Number of       
Contractual Level Involved 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 opened on:  8 Mar 2004, 23:27:51 
. regress  amount_thousand contract_level 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      38 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    36) =    1.60 
       Model |  37415473.5     1  37415473.5           Prob > F      =  0.2141 
    Residual |   842290923    36  23396970.1           R-squared     =  0.0425 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0159 
       Total |   879706397    37  23775848.6           Root MSE      =  4837.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
amount_tho~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     (95% Conf. Interval) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
contract_l~l |   706.0617   558.3376     1.26   0.214    -426.2993    1838.423 
     _cons |   1192.992    1293.66     0.92   0.363    -1430.672    3816.656 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. regress  amount_thousand  no_person_involve 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      40 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    38) =    0.71 
       Model |  16430441.5     1  16430441.5           Prob > F      =  0.4035 
    Residual |   874937089    38  23024660.2           R-squared     =  0.0184 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0074 
       Total |   891367530    39  22855577.7           Root MSE      =  4798.4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  (con’t) 
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Table 7.5 (con’t) 
amount_tho~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     (95% Conf. Interval) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
no_person_~e |   207.9375   246.1528     0.84   0.404    -290.3728    706.2478 
       _cons |   1641.981    1147.98     1.43   0.161    -681.9834    3965.946 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. log close 
       log:  D:\DATA\dissertation.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 closed on:  10 Mar 2004, 23:28:09 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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CHAPTER 8 
CASE STUDY 
 
In the previous chapters, the nature of corruption in Hong Kong construction industry is 
discussed and a few hypotheses were made. Here, a landmark corruption case, the 26 
Public Housing Blocks Case, in Hong Kong construction industry is studied in order to 
further support the illustrations on corruption behavior suggested in the previous 
chapters. 
 
26 Public Housing Blocks Case33 
8.1 Background  
In 1953, a big fire broke out at the Shek Kip Mei Squatter Area. More than 50,000 people 
were made homeless. The disaster speeded up the housing reform in Hong Kong. The 
government drew up a policy on public housing and a large number of low-cost housing 
estates were built to house the homeless. However, no-one could imagine that this huge 
project would sow seeds of a scandal in subsequent year which made the Hong Kong 
Government and the whole construction industry shameful.  
 
                                                 
33 Information obtained from ICAC 
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8.2 The Fear of Endanger Building 
On January 9, 1982, the ICAC received information that there were serious structural 
defects at some blocks of the Kwai Fong Estate blocks, an 11-block project built in 1971. 
The most serious problem was found at Block 6 where Housing Department inquiry 
revealed that the concrete was under strength. This was caused by insufficient cement 
being mixed into the concrete. This discovery is not a single case.  
 
Later in November 1985, the Housing Department, upon further investigation, discovered 
that the strength of the concrete in 26 public housing blocks (Table 8.1), which were all 
built between 1964 and 1973, were below standard. The ratio of cement to screed as set 
by the Work Bureau at the time was 1:5 to 1:7, however the 26 blocks were found to have 
a ratio as low as 1:19.2. 
 
8.2.1 Discussion  
 
The corruption act in the case comply with hypothesis 1 in Chapter 7—corruption in the 
construction industry must concentrate in the process in which (1) it is hard to be 
discovered without a close scrutiny; or (2) it would be discovered (regardless by whom) 
until a long time after the work is finished. Pilings and concrete are the most common 
materials which counterfeit materials are used to substitute in corruption cases. In fact, no 
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body can tell whether these kinds of materials are sub standard or not by pure observation 
and structural problems may not even be resulted as a safety factor is added in the 
calculation of the standard requirement. Public housing blocks built in the sixties and 
seventies were required to have a concrete strength of at least 3,000 pounds per square 
inch - or should not fall below 20.7MPA (MEGA PASCAL) in today's measurements. 
However, of all the 570 public housing blocks inspected by the Housing Department by 
the end of 1985, the average concrete strength was below 15MPA while one block 
registered a strength level as low as 5.9MPA.   
 
However, the structural safety of the public housings was affected in this case due to the 
extreme low strength of concrete and the 26 blocks have to be demolished. Nevertheless, 
the case was first discovered 11 years after the block was built, which was a long time. 
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Table 8.1: The 26 Problem Public Housing Blocks 
Kwai Fong Estate Blocks 8,9,10 and 11 
Kwai Hing Estate Blocks 3,4 and 5 
Kwai Shing East Estate Blocks 18 and 20 
Lam Tin Estate Blocks 12, 13 and 17 
Pat Tin Estate 14, 15 and 16 
Shek Lei Estate Blocks 4,6 
Sau Mau Ping Estate Block 26 
Shek Pai Wan Block 2 
Tsz Man Estate Blocks 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65 
Tsz On Estate Block 40 
Wong Chuk Hang Estate Block 9 
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8.3 Parties Involved 
Various parties from different contractual levels were involved in the case, including 
government officials, contractors, sub-contractors and site workers. The fact can be 
explained by the principal-agent problem explained in Chapter 5, due to the present of 
asymmetric information in the construction process and the diversity of objectives of the 
parties, corruption behavior arose. The housing policy to “build cheap and build quickly” 
in the sixties and early seventies led to the quick accent to prominence of small 
construction contractors. Examples are not rare. A construction company with slightly 
more than HK$200,000 in operating capital was awarded a government project of over 
$3.6 million in 1969. In the sixties this modest company was listed last in the 
government's register of contractors. It climbed to the top of the list in six years. This 
company was one of the contractors connected to the 26 problem blocks. Another 
construction firm that ran on miniscule capital and had only a few staff at that time also 
won a government contract for a HK$500,000 project. This company was given an 
additional eleven contracts at the peak of the public housing construction. And its staff 
size expanded to more than 20 in a short period of time. Putting up a large quantity of 
low cost estates for squatters was a top priority for them at that time. As such, quality 
control was less stringent than in other types of buildings. In order to secure contracts at a 
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low price but maintaining a profit, some contractors resort to the use of sub-standard 
building materials. One of the contractors connected to the problem blocks was found to 
have secured a contract at an incredibly low price. The tender price for the contract was 
more than HK$1 million lower than its nearest rival.  
 
Government officers colluded with the contractors as they could gain a fabulous reward 
by just carrying out a simple task—turning a blind eye to sub-standard work. With the 
connivance of government officers, by tampering with cement samples submitted to 
government laboratory test, the sub-standard cement and steel reinforcement work were 
able to escape from detection. One of the offended government project supervisor 
claimed while he did not know who was paying him, every time he was paid, a 
construction worker would inform him in advance where in the construction site he could 
picked up the bundle of cash. The money he received each month was equal to his 
monthly salary. This was commonly known in the construction industry that as “one 
payment made overly and the other covertly”. Besides the government officials, other 
monitors, such as the site foremen, could also “enjoy” the advantages. Again, the 
payment was equivalent to their monthly salary. Money was usually doled out each time 
in small sums of HK$200 or $300. Sometimes, gifts would be sent to them in replace of 
the money.  
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Part of the courage of the offenders to corrupt came from the lax supervision of 
construction work at that time. There were huge loopholes found in the monitoring 
system. Contractors could easily tamper the material samples before they were delivered 
to the government laboratory. Many government officials who were supposed to monitor 
building quality on the construction sites claimed that they were desk-bound by 
paperwork. The task of supervision was hence delegated to the site foremen. Some site 
foremen shirked their responsibility by claiming that they had to cope with an 
ever-growing amount of clerical work in addition to their own duties, and had no time for 
on-site supervision.  
 
8.3.1 Discussion 
 
In the case, various parties from different contractual level, which involve government 
officers, contractors and site foremen, colluded. This confirms the argument that 
extensive fragmentation favors corruption as more principal-agent relationships are 
created, and the objectives between the principals and the agents are different. The 
corruption was discovered after a long time. Besides the nature of the corruption 
(unobservable substandard concrete) which contributes to the late discovery, it could be 
believed that the size and the pattern of the corruption gangs were similar to the optimum 
situation of the case.  
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8.4 The Investigation  
The investigation by the ICAC of the case was never easy. A nine-man ICAC task force 
was set up for the investigation due to the seriousness of the case. One of the main 
obstacles facing the investigators was the fact that all the blocks were built between 1964 
and 1973, some 13 years before the investigation commenced. A sea of change could 
have taken place in between. In fact, six out of the nine contractors connected to the 
construction of the 26 blocks had ceased operation by 1986. The difficulty to collect 
relevant evidence could be imagined. Old files were dug out, bank accounts of civil 
servants and non-civil servants related to the projects were traced and the accounts and 
records of the contractors were examined. After affirming clues, an extensive 
interviewing program was carried out. As some of the people who involved have been 
emigrate, investigators have to travel overseas to interview them. However, most of them 
kept silent and those involved simply denied their corruption acts. The case had been 
regarded as a dead case until early 1987, an employee of a contractor and a retired 
government project supervisor finally agreed to testify. With the co-operation of the two, 
the ICAC investigation finally came to a conclusion and the case was referred to the 
Legal Department for further action. On November 2 1987, the Legal Department 
instituted prosecution against the alleged offenders. Three contractors and seven serving 
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or former civil servants were among the accused and charged with a total of 46 
corruption-related offences under the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance and Prevention 
of Bribery Ordinance. On March 11 1988, one of the contractors was found guilty and 
sentenced to 33 months' imprisonment and fined HK$325,000 by a District Court judge, 
who asserted that corruption needed to be seriously addressed. He rebuked the defendant 
saying that he, as a contractor, should be keenly that substandard concrete would pose 
grave potential danger to the public and the residents. Another contractor, charged with 
two offences under the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, was sentenced to three 
months' imprisonment, suspended for one year, and fined a HK$2,000 after taking his 
guilty plea into consideration. The trial of the last contractor had to be deferred due to 
health reasons. The others were acquitted. The investigation exposed that, apart from 
corruption, certain government officers had willfully neglected their site supervision 
duties or abused their powers during the construction of public housing estates between 
1964 and 1973. The ICAC therefore forwarded the list of the government officers 
concerned to the Civil Service Bureau for follow-up action.  
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8.4.1 Discussion 
 
The 26 problem blocks had to be pulled down due to safety reasons. New blocks had to 
be built to re-house the tenants. The cost incurred was huge. The cost in investigating the 
case was not small either. Fig 8.4.1 shows the statistics released by the ICAC regarding 
the case. Every single tax payer has to bear the cost. Corruption exerts a tremendous 
social cost to the society. Small portion of people benefit but the whole society suffered. 
Resources are relocated in a disorder and unfair manner. Hence, it is essential to 
minimized corruption in the society. 
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Table 8.2: Statistics Released by the ICAC Regarding the 26 Public Housing Blocks Case 
Files and contracts reviewed :  520  
Personnel & pension files examined in 5  
weeks:  
503  
Registration of persons checked :  1,031  
Business records searched:  84  
Criminal records reviewed:  44  
Enquired into persons/companies:  3,730  
Interviews conducted:  300  
Statements obtained:  281  
Overseas countries visited:  
USA, Canada, UK,  
Cyprus, Spain, New  
Zealand and Australia  
Total working hours logged:  22,000  
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CHAPTER 9 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
Corruption is regarded as a devil in the construction industry by most of the general 
public. Huge social cost is imposed to the public by the corruption act. Not only bringing 
unfairness to the society, the sub-standard buildings threaten life. As an international city, 
Hong Kong’s reputation, which is built up by the hard work of the citizens in the past 
decades, is ruined by the corruption acts. Yet, bribery is sometimes seen as bring about 
improvement of performance of the bureaucrats or to increase employment. (Ward (1989)) 
Rose-Ackerman (1978) argued that corruption actually increases the efficiency of the 
bureaucracy and the promise of corrupt gains may lower the salaries of employees. It 
“greases the wheels” of bureaucracies. Nevertheless, as what we have stated clearly in the 
very beginning of the paper, we are not going to answer the question “is corruption really 
bad?” Rather, we answer the question of “what to be done if society believes corruption 
is bad and should be eliminated”. It is impossible to get rid of every single case, but there 
are ways which the government and the industry can do in order to improve the situation.  
 
In the previous chapters, the economic nature of corruption and the corruption behavior 
in the construction industry were discussed. Equations formulating the corruption 
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behavior in the industry were also constructed. Base on these discussions, 
recommendations are suggested. By studying the relationships between the variables 
affecting corruption behavior, solution to the problem is not hard to be drawn. The 
ultimate aim is to reduce individual’s incentive to corrupt and increase their cost in 
corruption.  
 
9.1 System Reform 
The systems used in the construction industry which allow opportunities for corruption 
should be reformed.  
 
9.1.1 Objective Tender Selection Process 
Award of contracts is one of the popular stages which corruption exists. More transparent 
mechanism for tendering should be introduced, such as objective tender selection criteria. 
The Performance Assessment Scoring System (PASS) and the Maintenance Assessment 
Scoring System (MASS) established by the Hong Kong Housing Authority to assess the 
performance of contractors are good examples. Private sectors should have a lesson on 
this experience. By having objective selection criteria, the asymmetric information 
between the corporation and the employees (tender selection committee) would be 
reduced and hence the opportunity of corruption. 
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9.1.2 Strengthen the Monitoring System 
The monitoring system of in the industry should be also strengthened; increasing the 
number of inspectors and the frequency of inspection by the corporation and the 
government can lessen corruption.  
 
Recall equation (2) and also equation (3) 
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By having a strict monitoring system, the chance of discovering corruption acts (1-q) is 
higher. The expected profit of the developer and the monitor are lowered holding other 
factors constant.  
( 0),()()( <−⋅ LL QICIYQPΘ ) 
Hence, their cost to corruption would increase and hence the incentive to corrupt would 
decrease. 
 
9.1.3 Keeping account of past construction project 
The government should required construction firms to keep account of past construction 
projects for a certain period of time after the completion. (Say 5 years). In this way, the 
trace-back period for corruption case would be lengthened. As the trace-back period (J) in 
equation (3) increases, the expected profit of the employees would be decrease, hence his 
intension to corrupt.  
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9.2 Law Reform 
The criminal law is the first part of a comprehensive strategy. Imposing heavier penalty 
to corruption offence would no doubt increase the cost of corruption. The maximum 
imprisonment under current law is 10 years.34  As in the previous discussion, an 
assumption is made that the only cost for being discovered for corruption is the expected 
wage only. If penalty is included, obviously the cost for corruption would increase. 
Rewards given to people who report corruption would be another measure. The principal 
is simply increasing the probability of discovering corruption (1-q). However, finding the 
right mix of penalties, rewards and undercover law enforcement is not easy. Besides, the 
legal definition of corruption should be refined to avoid “grey area” for offenders. Under 
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap 201), food or drink for immediate consumption 
on any occasion are not regarded as bribe. This is an example of the loop holes in the law. 
It is not unusual that expensive and continuous entertainment is used as bribe in the 
industry. By filling the loop holes the opportunities for corruption is reduced. 
Nevertheless, one important lesson of the economic analysis of crime is unproblematic: 
anti-corruption policy should never aim to achieve complete rectitude. The goals of law 
enforcement should be to isolate those corrupt systems that are doing the most damage to 
                                                 
34 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap 201) section 12 
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the industry and, then, to organize the deterrence effort to make corruption costly on the 
margin and to give participants and incentive to report a corrupt deal. 
 
9.3 Contract reform 
Contract that relates wages and performance should be promoted. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, corruption occurs as performance and pay are not well related. In order 
to maximize utility, employee would put as least effort in the job as possible. Hence, 
contract which the pay is based on the performance should be promoted (Although an 
absolute direct relationship can never be achieved). An example is the piece-rate contract 
or contract with bonus which depends on the final profit. Besides, contract with awards 
can also be used to prevent corruption. Awards would be given to an employee if he is 
found honest after a period of time. In this way, the incentive of the employees not to 
corrupt is raised. 
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CHAPTER 10 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
10.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation is intended to investigate the economic nature of corruption and its 
behavior in Hong Kong construction industry. The issue has long been neglected in the 
literature around the world. The analysis is of great significance due to the huge social 
cost incurred by corruption to the public.  
 
Corruption in this dissertation is defined as “the behavior which involves an amount of 
resources, either in case or in kind, received by the agent(s) without any ex-ante consent 
of the principal(s) and in turn hurts the interests of the principal(s). In a market of perfect 
competition, no corruption would exist as there is no government intervention and the 
information in the market is perfect. However, the assumptions are released in real world. 
According to the Principal-Agent Model, the three necessary conditions for corruption to 
exists is the (1) division of labor, (2) divergence in objectives of the principal and agent 
and (3) asymmetric information. The effort input by the agent would be lower than the 
optimal input due to the non-observability of the effort and hence caused a welfare loss to 
the principal. 
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In the construction industry in Hong Kong, four types of principal-agent relationship 
exist. They are (1) Home purchaser – Property Developer, (2) Home Purchaser – Monitor, 
(3) Corporation (stockholders) – employee, and (4) Property developer – contractor. 
 
By theoretical analysis based on mathematics, factors affecting corruption behavior are 
illustrated. Due to economies of scale, monitor in the construction industry would be 
hired by the developer rather than by the home purchaser. Yet, this would not affect the 
monitors’ effort input as agents. The maximum amount of bribe willing to pay by the 
developer will be such that its expected profit for paying the bribe to corrupt is larger 
than not to do so. On the other hand, the minimum bribe the monitor willing to accept 
will be such that its expected profit for receiving the bribe to corrupt is larger than not to 
do so. Upon an increasing in wage, trace back period for corruption and the period in 
which the monitor retires, the amount of bribe willing to accept by the monitor would 
increase. A monitor would choose lump-sum payment rather than installment payment as 
the risk is less for the former. Corruption is feasible if the maximum bribe willing to offer 
by the developer is larger than the minimum bribe willing to accept by the monitor. And 
there would be an optimal size and pattern of distribution of persons in different 
contractual levels which the probability of being discovered of the corruption act is 
smallest.  
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Hong Kong construction industry favors corruption because of its lengthy and 
complicated construction process, complexity and uniqueness of the output and its 
fragmented structure. They contribute to the number of principal-agent relationship and 
asymmetric information.  
 
Four Hypotheses are set based on the theoretical analysis. They are subjected to empirical 
testing and the results are as followed.  
 
Hypothesis 1: if our model on corruption is correct, corruption in the construction 
industry must concentrate in the process in which (1) it is hard to be discovered without a 
close scrutiny; or (2) it would be discovered (regardless by whom) until a long time after 
the work is finished.               
 
Hypothesis 2: if our model on corruption is correct, following hypothesis 1, the amount 
of bribe involved in nature 2 corruption (short piles) will be larger than that of nature 4 
(counterfeit materials).   
 
Hypothesis 3: Corruptions that hurt the interest of a company directly and in the more 
present future will be discovered a shorter period than otherwise. 
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Hypothesis 4: The effect of increasing in the number of persons in different contractual 
level on corruption amount will be larger than that of number of persons in the same 
contractual level. 
Hypothesis 1 and 3 conform to evidence. Evidence supporting hypothesis 2 is weak and 
hypothesis 4 is not supported by facts. The testing results generally give a positive 
affirmation to the discussions in the dissertation.  
 
A land mark corruption case in Hong Kong construction industry, 26 Public Housing 
Blocks Case, is studied and the facts in the case comply with the theoretical analysis. It 
gives a further affirmation to the discussion. 
 
In order to lessen corruption in Hong Kong construction industry, recommendations are 
given based on the reform on three areas, which are system reform, law reform and 
contract reform. The ultimate aim is to reduce individual’s incentive to corrupt and 
increase their cost in corruption. 
 
Based on the above conclusion, it is regarded by the author that the objectives set at the 
start of the dissertation are achieved.  
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10.2 Limitations of the Research Study 
The major limitation of the study is the lack of disclosure of relevant corruption cases in 
the Hong Kong Construction Industry. Request has been sent to the ICAC for information 
of relevant cases. Yet, owing to confidential problem and the limitation of its database, 
only cases after 1999 are available. With a larger number of cases, the significance of the 
empirical testing would be increased.  
 
Secondly, the possible solutions are proposed and based on the theoretical analysis on the 
libertarian and liberal economics. The proposed solutions are somehow composed of the 
associations of different theories, while no proof of the possible existence can be given or 
rejected. 
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10.3 Further Area for Research 
The number of research carried out on corruption in Hong Kong construction industry is 
very few. Yet, it is worthy to do so due to the high social cost imposed by corruption to 
the society. This dissertation gives a fundamental analysis to the issue. It provides a solid 
base to further research on the area. Specific corruption acts can be further studied in 
detail. Solutions proposed by the author are based on theoretical analysis and are not 
subjected to any test. Further research can be carried out on the three proposed reform 
areas—the system, the law, and the contract. Possible and detailed solutions would be 
valuable to Hong Kong construction industry.  
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Jesus said, “For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the 
whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man 
give in exchange for his soul?”35 
                                                 
35 Prickett, S. and Barnes, R. (1991) The Bible Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
  Matthew 16:26 
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ANNEX 1 
Clauses in the Standard Form of Construction Contract used in Hong Kong 
 
1. Main Contractor’s obligations 2. Architect’s instructions 
3. Contract documents 4. Statutory obligations, notices, fees 
and charges 
5. Levels and setting out of the work 6. Materials, goods, and workmanship 
to conform to description, testing and 
inspection 
7. Royalties and patent rights 8. Foreman-in-charge 
9. Access for Architect to the works 10. Clerk of works 
11. Variations, provisional and prime 
cost sums 
12. Contract bills 
13. Contract sum 14. Materials and goods, unfixed or 
off-site 
15. practical completion and defects 
liability 
16. Sectional completion 
17. Assignment or sub-letting 18. Injury to persons and property and 
Employer’s indemnity 
19. Insurance against injury to persons 
and property 
20. Insurance of the works against fire, 
etc 
21. Possession, completion and 
postponement 
22. Damages for non-completion 
23. Extension of Time 24. Loss and expense caused by 
disturbance of regular progress of the 
works 
25. Determination by Employer 26. Determination by Main Contractor 
27. Nominated Sub-Contractors 28. Nominated Suppliers 
29. Artists and tradesmen 30. Certificates and payments 
31. Surety bond 32. Outbreaks of hostilities 
33. War damage 34. Antiquities 
35. Arbitration 36. Fluctuation in wage rates 
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ANNEX 2 
Official Reply from ICAC on the Availability of Relevant Corruption Cases 
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ANNEX 3 
Summary of the 62 Cases Used in the Empirical Testing 
date of 
release Organization(s) nature
Amount in
thousand 
Time 
(month)
No. of 
person 
involved 
No. of 
contractual 
level 
2001/7/17 
Architectural Services 
Department 
Sun Wah Engineering Company
Sunspower Construction  
Limited 1 2 15 2 1
2003/8/22 
Antonfield Engineering Company
unrevealed owners' incorporation 1 40 29 2 2
2001/10/23 Union Fair Engineering Ltd.  1 42 25 2 1
2002/12/3 
The Repulse Bay Co. Ltd. 
Kings View Airconditioning 
Engineering Co. Ltd. 
Fullwick Engineering Company 1 92 36 2 1
2002/3/6 
Housing Department 
Good Year Professional Services 
Company 
Asia Growing Engineering Limited 1 100 32 3 1
2001/12/7 
OI of Wingco Mansion 
Chau Mou Engineering & 
Company 1 160  2 3
2002/5/6 
Lands Department 
Individual small house developers 1 180 19 9 1
2003/11/18 Housing Department 1 199 47 2 2
2001/4/18 
VSC Engineering Products Co. 
Ltd. 
Poly Colour Engineering 
Company 1 200 15 2 3
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2003/2/18 In-Concept International Limited 1 200 20 3 2
2003/1/28 
Architectural Services 
Department 
Buildings Department 
Teamworld Construction & 
Consultantcy Co. Limited 1 210 15 3 2
2002/1/23 
Sentry Builders Hardware Limited
Extensive Trading Company 
Limited 1 270 30 2 2
2002/1/17 
Rolling View Limited 
Diploma Construction Company 1 500 13 2 3
2001/9/28 Hung Fung Engineering Limited 1 846 33 2 2
2003/10/23 
Chinese Temples Committee 
WaiShing Construction Company 
Limited 1 950 36 2 3
2001/8/6 Housing Department 1 1000 14 16 3
2001/5/14 
CLP Power Hong Kong Limited 
Wingo Engineering Company 1 1300 43 3 3
2001/8/2 unrevealed renovation contractor 1 1500 31 2 4
2002/8/29 
Housing Department 
Tridant Engineering Company 
Limited 1 1500 38 2 3
2003/2/28 
Housing Department 
Tridant Engineering Company 
Limited 1 1500 39 2 4
2001/8/21 
Housing Department 
Good Year Professional Services 
Company 1 2000 37 2 3
2002/8/29 
Housing Department 
Brongham Park Limited 
Shun Cheong M&E Limited 
Tridant Engineering Company 
Limited 1 2100 20 3 4
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2004/1/5 
Housing Department 
unrevealed contractors 1 3000 40 5 3
2002/9/19 
Sun Wah Engineering Company
Wan Chung Construcytion 
Company Limited 1 4000 42 2 3
2002/12/13 
The Wharf (Holdings) Limited  
Ping Kee Construction (HK) Co. 
Limited 1 10000 12 2 2
2003/6/5 
Wilson Professional Consultants 
Ltd. 
OI of Yau Tong Centre 1 12000 12 2 4
2002/8/16 
Wang Yip Materials and 
Engineering Limited 1 22600 42 2 4
2002/4/25 
Antiquities and Monuments Office
unrevealed contractor 1  30 4 0
2001/7/30 
Housing Department 
Paul Y-ITC General Contractors 
Ltd. 
Penta-Ocean Construction Ltd. 1  31 23 0
2002/11/12 
Sunny World Engineering 
Company 1  32 28 0
2003/1/8 
Chun Wo Construction and 
Engineering Ltd.  
The Wharf (Holdings) Limited 1  40 2 0
2003/10/16 Owners' Incorporations 1  41 2 1
2003/4/9 Fire Services Department 1  46 5 0
2002/12/12 unrevealed listed company 1   10 0
2001/8/29 Hui Hon Foundations Limited 2 970 50 2 1
2003/7/23 Hui Hon Foundations Limited 2 970 60 5 0
2002/9/3 Hui Hon Contractors Ltd. 2  52 2 0
2003/10/31 
B+B Construction Limited 
Housing Authority 2  53 2 0
2002/10/18 I-P Foundations Ltd.  2  57 9 1
2001/9/14 
Hsin Chong Construction 
Company Limited 2  60 2 0
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2001/10/11 
Hsin Yieh Architects & Associates 
Limited 
Joseph Chow & Partners Limited 2  70 2 0
2003/1/16 
Kowloon Canton Railway 
Corporation 2   9 0
2001/7/5 
Architectural Services 
Department 
Sunspower Construction Limited 3 12 19 2  
2001/4/20 
Mass Transit Railway Corporation
Xiaoming Engineering Company 3 20.5 30 6  
2001/10/9 
Strong Progress Limited 
Wide Development Limited 3 40 24 2 0
2001/6/11 
China Overseas Machinery 
Limited 
unrevealed sub contractor 3 42 31 2 0
2001/11/9 Lands Department 3 80 12 2 0
2001/12/5 P2H Design Associates Limited 3 315 25 8 0
2002/5/13 individuals 3 4000 25 2 0
2003/8/28 
Highways Department 
Sonway Engineering Limited 
Asbestos Abatement Limited 3  22 9 0
2003/10/16 
Leisure and Cultural Services 
Department 
Field Archaeological Xonsultant 3  33 5 0
2002/3/26 Housing Department 3  35 7 0
2003/1/3 
Hsin Chong Construction 
Company Limited 3  37 5 1
2001/7/20 unrevealed laboratory 3   2 0
2003/4/9 Fire Services Department 3   28 0
2001/11/23 unrevealed tiles suppliers 4 350  7 0
2004/1/12 
Hong Kong Housing Society 
New Way Engineering Company 4 800 44 4 0
2002/6/24 
Basic Engineering Company 
Limited  4 3900 34 2 0
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2003/1/8 
E. Bon Building Materials Co. Ltd.
Newise International Limited 4 16800 40 13 0
2001/11/28 Wide Development Limited 4  33 2 0
2001/11/24 
Cheung Kee Fung Cheung 
Construction Company Limited 4  35 2 0
2002/6/10 Highways Department 4  49 2 0
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